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I. INTRODUCTION
Kirby Randall, seventeen, wakes before the sun is up. His internal clock
tells him that, before long, the cattle will also be waking up and moving
around, ready for breakfast.
He sits up, sticks his bare feet into the legs of a pair of Levi-brand blue
jeans, dons a T-shirt, sits down again, and pulls wool socks on. After that,
he puts on a pair of pointed toed calf-high cowboy boots, sticks his arms in
a work shirt, buttons it, and feels ready to greet the herd.
He knows that cattle, once they lie down for the night, usually sleep
through it, but become active just before first light and seek to satisfy their
hunger. Left unattended, they will drift as far as they can, which means more
work to round them up later for branding, sale, and shipment. He has an
incentive to keep the cattle contained; he later will be responsible for the
necessary roundup as well.
Kirby works with a half-dozen other cowboys, who divide the necessary
tasks up among themselves and alternate standing watch through the night
on alert for anything that might cause a stampede. He is an employee of the
ranch owner and gets paid a monthly wage, reporting to the foreman who
started out as a cowboy just like him.
So far, this story could describe a Kirby in 1870 on a 10,000-acre ranch in
Texas or Wyoming or the middle of a long cattle drive from Texas to Dodge
City. But this Kirby is a twentieth-century cowboy. He has slept in a bed in
a bunkhouse, probably air-conditioned and uses a properly equipped
bathroom in the bunkhouse to brush his teeth, relieve himself, and to shower,
probably daily, rather than going unwashed for weeks at a time and having
to improvise for the other activities in creeks and prairies.
The herd of cattle that Kirby tends belong to only one rancher rather than
being intermingled on the open range with herds belonging to others.
Kirby’s ranch is likely only a few hundred acres rather than thousands or tens
of thousands of acres.
When he goes to work, Kirby is as likely to drive an ATV1 or Jeep as he
is to ride a horse. He wants to get his helicopter pilot’s license so that he can
participate in the new technique of rounding up cattle by a small helicopter:
1. See Amos Kwon, 10 Best Sportsman’s All-Terrain Vehicles, GEAR PATROL (Jan.
23, 2015), https://gearpatrol.com/2015/01/23/10-best-atvs-and-utvs/ (listing popular
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a technique that is just beginning to gain support, more in Australia and New
Zealand than in the United States, so far.
Kirby knows considerably more and pays more attention to selective
breeding of the cattle in his charge than his 1870 counterpart; an important
part of the brand of his employer is its particular breeds of cattle with
associated characteristics desired by the meat processors to whom it sells. In
1870, on the open range, cows and bulls mingled freely, and there was not
much opportunity for the ranchers and cowboys to determine who mated
with whom. Like his 1870 counterpart, Kirby keeps a gun with him most of
the day, but it is not a revolver that he wears on his hip. It is a long gun that
he keeps in the vehicle he is using or in a scabbard on the horse. It is not for
fighting or defending his herd against rustlers;2 it is for snakes and wild
animals that are not part of a “protected species.”
Like his 1870s counterpart, Kirby aspires to own his ranch and herd
someday. But rather than beginning to build it by branding “mavericks” on
his own,3 he will try to negotiate a deal with his employer to acquire the
necessary stock and to pay for it with salary deductions. He will seek
agreement to mingle his private stock with his employer’s herds and make
economic arrangements for that as well.
If it turns out that ranching does not suit him as a long-term occupation,
or if he is unable to work out the necessary business arrangement, he has
other options available to him. This fall, he will attend college while he
continues to work. He is unlikely to become a town marshal, a stagecoach
guard, a gambler, or a saloon keeper.
Kirby’s roommate, Bennington, performs other aspects of Kirby’s 1870
counterpart’s job — what remains of the long cattle drive function.
Bennington is an independent owner-operator truck driver, who specializes
in hauling live cattle. The cattle, rather than being driven on the hoof by
traditional cowboys, now are transported in a semitrailer attached to
Bennington’s truck tractor. His work replaces not only the cattle drive itself
but the transport of live cattle in rail cars to processing plants. Some industry
observers call Bennington an “asphalt cowboy.”4
2. See Wyatt Bechtel, Cattle Rustlers Busted in Oklahoma Sting Operation,
DROVERS (Aug. 15, 2018, 3:06 PM), https://www.drovers.com/ok-cattle-sting (showing
that rustling is still a problem and reporting on cattle theft detected at auction).
3. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Rise and Fall of the Cowboy: Technology, Law, and
Creative Destruction in the Industrialization of The Food Industry, 94 N.D.L. REV. 361,
383–85 (2019) (describing the practice of allowing cowboys to build their own herds by
capturing maverick calves — calves weaned without being branded with their mothers’
brands); see also Lewis A. Maverick, The Term “Maverick,” Applied to Unbranded
Cattle, 1 CAL. FOLKLOREQ. 94, 95 (1942) (stating that so long as mavericks remain with
their mother, the mother’s brand identifies it).
4. SHANEHAMILTON, TRUCKINGCOUNTRY: THEROAD TOAMERICA’SWAL-MART
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Kirby and Bennington’s jobs are the result of four waves of Creative
Destruction, the first two of which were the subject of the author’s first
article on the industrial revolution in the food industry, Rise and Fall of the
Cowboy.5
The next two waves of Creative Destruction that gave rise to Kirby and
Bennington’s work were shaped by exemptions from general laws that
channeled other American industries, in particular economic regulation of
transportation and labor law and collective bargaining. This light touch of
the law permitted market institutions in the cattle industry to adapt well to
important changes in technology after the demise of the long cattle drive.
This article begins by reviewing the four waves of Creative Destruction that
shaped the American cattle industry from the end of the Civil War to the end
of the twentieth century, then identifies the technological and sociological
drivers of those waves, focuses on how twentieth-century law left beef
markets largely alone, and concludes with a sketch of the twenty-first century
in which laws specifically aimed at the cattle industry are likely to change it
significantly.
II. FOURWAVES OF CREATIVEDESTRUCTION IN THEBEEF INDUSTRY
Joseph Schumpeter named the inevitable process of change and
innovation in market economics “Creative Destruction.”6 Creative
Destruction results when new technologies and business methods spawn
entrepreneurship and new enterprises that eclipse incumbent enterprises.7
Thus the railroad industry replaced the steamboat industry, and telephony
and radio led to the demise of the telegraph industry.8
Creative Destruction is a model for understanding the causal relationships
ECONOMY 135 (2008) (using term in chapter title).
5. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 371 (analyzing the determinants of the first two
waves of Creative Destruction in the beef industry); U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC.,
CONCENTRATION IN THE RED MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY 71–72 (1996),
https://www.gipsa.usda.gov/psp/publication/con_tech%20report/conc-rpt.pdf
[hereinafter CONCENTRATION IN THE RED MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY] (summarizing
history of beef industry since 1600 and how transportation and refrigeration encouraged
its evolution).
6. See JOSEPHA. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT 212–55
(1983).
7. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83
(1975) (stating that the capitalist economy continues to thrive when innovative goods,
techniques, and ventures arise as a result of the current capitalist market).
8. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 368–69; see also Tomas Nonnenbacher, History of
the U.S. Telegraph Industry, EH.NET, http://www.eh.net/?s=history+of+the+u.s.+
telegraph+industry (last visited May 31, 2020) (explaining how the twentieth century
saw a rise in the use of the telephone as it was both easier and faster to use, which led to
the decline of the telegraph).
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between stimuli and effects.9 Stimuli comprise new technologies introduced
into specific markets.10 Their effects, the model predicts, will be the
weakening of incumbent firms and the rise of new ones that eventually
replace the incumbents.11 As with any system subjected to stimuli, the
effects exhibit various lags.12 Some effects occur relatively soon; others are
delayed for years or decades. Often, one stimulus causes effects that make
the system receptive to other stimuli that set off their own effects.13 For
example, the Creative Destruction model, as it relates to the beef industry, is
explained below. The closing off of the open range began to occur even as
the long cattle drives were starting in the 1870s, intensified through the
remainder of the nineteenth century, and finally was codified years later in
the Taylor Act.14 The effects of this change in land use rights were felt within
a decade but continued to play out through many decades more.15
Similarly, railroad technology was the stimulus that produced effects in
the form of long cattle drives as soon as railheads appeared in Kansas,
Nebraska, and Wyoming. As the technology penetrated further, however, it
also helped produce an opposing effect; ending the long cattle drives by
establishing railheads closer to where herds were cultivated.16
The first wave17 of Creative Destruction in the beef industry ended
9. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 7, at 83 (explaining that Creative Destruction
exemplifies the method in which the economy evolves and adapts).
10. See id. (stating for instance that in the transportation industry, the economy
moved “from the mail coach to the airplane”).
11. See id.
12. See id. (explaining that the process of Creative Destruction often takes time and,
as a result, should be judged after the passage of time).
13. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 368 (exemplifying how an old technology or tool,
such as steamboats, were replaced by a new technology or tool employed to perform the
same activity).
14. See 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1934) (providing that the Secretary of the Interior has the
authority to regulate the grazing of public lands); see also Perritt, supra note 3, at 400
(stating that the Taylor Act mandated federal administration of grazing on the public
domain).
15. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 404–05 (explaining how property laws created
private farming rights on former open rangeland).
16. Perritt, supra note 3, at 392. See generally STEVENW.USSELMAN, REGULATING
RAILROAD INNOVATION 15–60 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002) (discussing the railroad
expansion and the politics of the western railroad development).
17. The definition of “waves” of Creative Destruction is arbitrary. The first and
second waves were relatively distinct from the effects of the railroad felt before the
effects of the steel-bladed plow, the windmill, and barbed wire. The third wave is
distinguished from the second because of the demise of the long cattle drive and open
range ranching. Similarly, the third wave is not neatly distinguished from the fourth.
The determinants of the fourth wave, particularly truck technology and the public
roadbuilding program, intensified the decentralization of beef processing, which was the
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localized beef production and gave rise to large-scale open-range ranching
and concentrated, geographically centralized beef processing, connected by
railroads to railheads where the long cattle drives terminated.18 The second
wave of Creative Destruction brought this industry structure to an end and
shifted cattle raising to smaller, enclosed plots of land closer to railheads,
which had become more numerous. From 1894 to1905, cattle ranchers
transitioned away from using open-range ranching to fenced and owned land;
development changed the economics because of land cost.19 Even as the
range wars were sputtering out and a proposal for a federally supported
National Cattle Drive was failing in Congress,20 ranchers in Montana and
Wyoming were adapting to reality. They were using barbed wire to fence
their ranches rather than relying on the open range. They were growing hay21
for winter feeding, and they were using smaller pastures that resembled the
feedlots of the twentieth century. They also were putting more
entrepreneurial energy into improving cattle bloodlines.22
The third wave occurred in the first third of the twentieth century23 and
gave rise to a fundamentally different industry structure, which evolved from
the ruins of the second wave.24 The third wave gave rise to a more
hallmark of the third. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 401). See generally J. STANLEY
METCALFE, EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION 10–72 (1998)
(tracing the history of Creative Destruction through changes of economic models).
18. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 371 (analyzing the determinants of the first two wave
of Creative Destruction in the beef industry); see alsoCONCENTRATION IN THEREDMEAT
PACKING INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at 71–72 (summarizing how operating costs were
reduced in the late 1950s because of the advanced highway system and new refrigeration,
slaughter, and shipping technologies).
19. J. OGDEN ARMOUR, THE PACKERS, THE PRIVATE CAR LINES, AND THE PEOPLE
150–51 (1906).
20. See THOMAS F. MCILWRAITH & EDWARD K. MULLER, NORTH AMERICA THE
HISTORICALGEOGRAPHY OF A CHANGINGCONTINENT 252 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining that
the cattle interests proposed a bill in 1885 to establish a national trail from Texas to
Canada).
21. See ARMOUR, supra note 19, at 314 (detailing the use of stored hay as cattle
fodder during grass shortages).
22. CHRISTOPHER KNOWLTON, CATTLE KINGDOM: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
COWBOYWEST 234 (2017).
23. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 398–99 (noting that feedlots took force in society
nearly fifty years after the end of the nineteenth century); see, e.g., Shawn L. Archibeque,
Dillon M. Feuz & John J. Wagner, The Modern Feedlot for Finishing Cattle, 2 ANN.
REV. ANIMAL BIOSCIENCES 535, 550 (2014) (commenting that the feedlot industry
developed in north–central Colorado in the 1930s and 1940s thanks to the availability of
growing crop–yields).
24. Perritt, supra note 3, at 398–99; see A Timeline of Changes: Beef Cattle Farming
in North America, ARROWQUIP (June 6, 2017), https://arrowquip.com/blog/cattle-
research/timeline-of-changes-beef-cattle-north-america (discussing the trends in beef
cattle commercialization in the latter part of the nineteenth century and beyond).
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centralized industry that cultivated smaller herds near feedlots and widely
dispersed beef processing facilities. Accordingly, beef packers had early
instincts to locate slaughtering and dressing facilities as close to the cattle
herds as possible.25 The dominance of the Chicago stockyards faded as the
beef packers shifted most of their activity to “branch operations” in places
like Omaha, Kansas City, and Fort Worth.26
By the close of the 1880s, the packers were beginning to build branch
plants near the herds. In 1888 a plant came into operation in Kansas City.27
By 1893 dressing plants were springing up along the Missouri River.28 The
Chicago packers were developing “auxiliary markets” in Kansas City, South
Omaha, East St. Louis, Fort Worth.29 Local herds near auxiliary markets
stayed on local pastures and barns and were fattened on corn right where it
was grown.30 In 1900, Chicago had a third of the market for meatpacking.
Kansas and Nebraska had ten percent each.31
The fourth wave of Creative Destruction occurred in the second half of the
twentieth century with the interstate highway system, the development of the
refrigerated truck trailer, and truck drivers hired as independent contractors.
The highway based system of slaughtering houses and beef dressing facilities
eliminated the intermediary and enabled many farmers to deal directly with
retail supermarket chains and to ship their beef directly to them after one stop
at a combined slaughterhouse and dressing facility.32
The fourth wave intensified geographic dispersion of beef processing
facilities and operating trucks on public highways linked cow-calf operations
with feedlots and beef processors.33 The beef processors shipped processed
25. See Union Stock Yard & Transit Co., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI. (2005),
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/2883.html [hereinafter Stock Yard]
(stating that better transportation methods allowed the beef industry to be decentralized).
26. See Meatpacking, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHIC. (2005), http://www.encyclopedia.
chicagohistory.org/pages/804.html [hereinafter Meatpacking] (explaining that railroads
allowed beef packers to move their operations further out into the Great Plains).
27. LOUIS F. SWIFT & ARTHUR VAN VLISSINGEN, JR., THE YANKEE OF THE YARDS:
THEBIOGRAPHY OFGUSTAVUS FRANKLIN SWIFT 131–32 (1927) [hereinafter YANKEE OF
THEYARDS]
28. See id. at 28 (stating that plants along the Missouri River were made so that
cattle did not need to be shipped as far).
29. See Gail Lorna DiDonato, Student Work, Building the Meat Packing Industry in
South Omaha, 1883-1898, U. NEB. 17 (1989) (stating that packing centers arose as cities
tried to overtake Chicago’s dominance in the meatpacking industry).
30. See ARMOUR, supra note 19, at 117–18 (explaining that farmers began to fatten
their cattle on their own land in order to improve the quality of the meat).
31. Id. at 156.
32. See Meatpacking, supra note 26 (explaining that the progression of technology
and new industry practices allowed farmers to deal more directly with customers).
33. See Stock Yard, supra note 25 (explaining that highways helped to decentralize
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beef in frozen form (“boxed beef”) on trucks directly to retail outlets.34 Six
technologies animated the fourth wave.35 Feedlots, interstate highways,
refrigerated truck trailers,36 further automation of slaughtering and packing,
flash freezing, and packaging technologies.
Cattle intended for slaughter still spent the first six to nine months of their
lives nourishing on their mother’s milk.37 Then they were turned loose into
larger pastures to feed on grass and supplementary hay for twelve to eighteen
months.38 The cattle finished on corn and other carefully selected
combinations in more concentrated feedlots located as close as practicable
to geographically distributed slaughterhouses.39 Replacement of rail links
by trucks meant that the modern beef cow has to walk almost nowhere.
In the first and second waves, land law and railroad subsidies drove
economic events.40 The beef industry, like the rest of American industry,
faced an inflection point in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.41
U.S. heavy industry and railroads became subject to comprehensive
regulation and collective bargaining.42 The beef industry did not. Except for
the beef industry).
34. See id.
35. See id. (listing the six technologies that helped revolutionize the industry).
36. See generally U.S. Patent No. 1969151 (filed June 5, 1933) (patenting the design
for a refrigerated truck); U.S. Patent No. 2096712 (filed Dec. 2, 1932) (patenting the
design for a truck’s mechanical refrigerating system).
37. See Karin Lindquist et al., How to Wean Cattle, WIKIHOW (Mar. 29, 2019),
https://www.wikihow.com/Wean-Cattle; Jen Davis, What Happens if You Don’t Wean
Calves?, PETS ONMOM, https://animals.mom.me/happens-dont-wean-calves-9821.html
(last visited May 31, 2020) (explaining the preferences for weaning calves in a cattle
operation).
38. Barry Estabrook, Feedlots vs. Pastures: Two Very Different Ways to Fatten Beef
Cattle, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 28, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/
2011/12/feedlots-vs-pastures-two-very-different-ways-to-fatten-beef-cattle/250543/.
39. Perritt, supra note 3, at 371–72.
40. Perritt, supra note 3, at 369; see Sean M. Kammer, Railroad Land Grants in an
Incongruous Legal System: Corporate Subsidies, Bureaucratic Governance, and Legal
Conflict in the United States, 1850-1903, 35 L. & HIST. REV. 391, 405–06 (2017)
(explaining that despite the unpopularity of railroad subsidies, Congress subsidized
millions of acres for railroads from 1850–1870, noting the potential for economic growth
and spread of “civilization”).
41. Perritt, supra note 3, at 372–73; Cassidy L. Woodard, From Cattle Drives to
Labeling Legislation: Implications of Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling on the
Beef Industry, 47 TEX. L. REV. 399, 401–02 (2015) (describing how the increased
demand for beef at the end of the nineteenth century led to the drastic change from
romanticized cattle drives to the growth of the grotesque meat packing conditions and
slaughterhouses).
42. Perritt, supra note 3, at 423–25; U.S.D.A., AGRIC. COOPERATIVE SERV., SERV.
REP. 38, MARKETINGFEDCATTLE: COOPERATIVEOPPORTUNITIES (Sept. 1993) (detailing
the beginning of collective actions in the U.S. livestock industry, including cooperative
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the antitrust action brought against the Big Five Packers by the Roosevelt
Administration and labeling standards promulgated by the United States
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), most segments of the beef industry
continued to enjoy a laissez-faire environment throughout the twentieth
century.43 This laissez-faire environment allowed the third and fourth waves
to develop, driven by technology.44
Rigorous analysis obligates a student of Creative Destruction to identify
the victims and the beneficiaries of each wave. In the cattle industry, the
victims of the first wave were local cattle farmers and local slaughterhouses,
located near Eastern consumer markets.45 The beneficiaries were Texas
cattle ranchers, the promoters of cattle towns in Kansas, Nebraska, and
Wyoming, and the entrepreneurs who built consolidated beef processing
facilities such as the Chicago Stockyards.46 In the second wave, the victims
were the Texas ranchers and the promoters of cattle towns.47 The
beneficiaries were smaller cattle farmers and ranchers in the West and the
beef processors who had the foresight to take advantage of the spreading
railroad technology by establishing remote facilities near the cattle. 48
public auctions and small sale lots).
43. Perritt, supra note 3, at 415; Committee on Evaluation of USDA Streamlined
Inspection System for Cattle (SIS-C), CATTLE INSPECTION 9–11 (1990), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK235649/ (discussing the timeline of changes to
regulation of the beef industry).
44. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 367 (noting some technological advancements in
meat storage and preservation, including canning, pickling, and refrigeration). See
generally A Timeline of Changes: Beef Cattle Farming in North America, ARROWQUIP
(June 6, 2017), https://arrowquip.com/blog/cattle-research/timeline-of-changes-beef-
cattle-north-america (discussing innovations in production that impacted the beef
industry).
45. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 365 (discussing how the increased popularity of cattle
drives led ranchers to cultivate herds closer to railroads and farther from small towns);
see also John Fraser Hart & Chris Mayda, The Industrialization of Livestock Production
in the United States, 38 SOUTHEASTERNGEOGRAPHER 58, 60–61 (1998) (describing how
the modern impact of rapid industrialization of the cattle industry after World War II is
that a small number of large farms produce a disproportionate share of U.S. livestock
products).
46. Perritt, supra note 3, at 375; see alsoHart &Mayda, supra note 45, at 63 (finding
that early developments in livestock industrialization left the industry “concentrated in
the Denver-Omaha-Lubbock triangle, especially in the Southern High Plains area of
southwestern Kansas and the panhandles of Oklahoma and Texas”).
47. Perritt, supra note 3, at 397; Elmer Kelton, The Texas Almanac: Ranching in a
Changing Land, TEX. ALMANAC (2007), https://texasalmanac.com/topics/agriculture/
ranching-changing-land (explaining that blizzards, overgrazing, and drought contributed
to loss of income for Texas ranchers).
48. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-RCED-97-100, PACKERS AND
STOCKYARDS PROGRAMS: USDA’S RESPONSE TO STUDIES ON CONCENTRATION IN THE
LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY 16 (1997) (summarizing concentration of industry in Chicago, and
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In the third wave, the victims were ranchers who clung to grazing, now on
enclosed plots, as a way of feeding their cattle.49 The beneficiaries were the
grain farmers who fed their corn surpluses to cattle on their own properties
or feedlots established by others.50 In the fourth wave, the spread and
eventual dominance of truck technology operated on extensive public
highways victimized the railroads and the processing firms who concentrated
their capital at rail terminals.51 The beneficiaries were the owners of new,
more decentralized, processing facilities located within a day’s truck drive
of cow-calf operations.52 The same stimuli intensified the feedlot
phenomenon, further victimizing farmers who stuck to grass-fed beef and
benefiting entrepreneurs who established specialized and larger feedlots.
Multiple stimuli often reinforce each other and intensify effects.53 For
example, feedlots, distinct from cattle ranches, first emerged because of the
corn surpluses, but their evolution and eventual dominance of a phase in the
then fragmentation after World War II, with slaughterhouses relocating near feedlots in
the western High Plains).
49. Perritt, supra note 3, at 394–95; John J. Hasko, Cattle v. Sheep: The Idaho
Experience, 3 THE CRIT: CRITICAL STUD. J. 79, 89 (2010) (discussing cattle grazing for
feed sources).
50. See Perritt, supra note 3, 394–95 (noting that farmers had struggled to develop
fencing to keep cattle in and the invention of the barbed wire fence, which allowed
farmers to keep their cattle on their properties); J.S. Cotton & W.F. Ward, Economical
Cattle Feeding in the Corn Belt, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (June 24, 1914), https://digital.
library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc85802/ (arguing that it was cheaper to feed cattle
corn).
51. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 398 (noting that the refrigerated truck trailer and
highway system displaced centralized slaughterhouses linked to markets by a railroad);
HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 136–37 (discussing the revolutionary impact of refrigerated
trucks on the meatpacking industry by enabling smaller market players to bypass rail and
the monopolized system of large meatpackers).
52. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 398–99 (explaining that the fourth round of Creative
Destruction led to a decentralized system of smaller farms and feedlots linked to regional
slaughterhouses and markets by truckers and there was no longer a need to move cattle
across open ranges to transport them via railroads); Marc Stimpert, Counterpoint:
Opportunities Lost and Opportunities Gained: Separating Truth from Myth in the
Western Ranching Debate, 36 ENVTL. L. 481, 490 (2006) (explaining that open ranges
led to competition for limited resources, resulting in landed ranchers excluding other
kinds of ranchers from access to land and water and resorting to harassment to maintain
control).
53. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 398–99 (tracing the growth of feedlots from small
farms to large factories with a thousand cattle stimulated by emergence from feedlots
from excess corn and the development of refrigerated trucks); Erik Schlenker-Goodrich,
Moving Beyond Public Lands Council v. Babbitt: Land Use Planning and the Range
Resource, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 139, 144–45 (2001) (stating that the competition for
resources, coupled with the arrival of sheep in the western range, resulted in even more
competition for resources, ultimately leading to ecological degradation).
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production chain resulted from truck transportation on public highways.54
III. DRIVERS OF THE THIRD AND FOURTHWAVES
The closing of the open range led to the demise of the long cattle drive and
marked the second wave of Creative Destruction.55 The second wave put in
motion forces that led to the third wave.56 Advances in truck technology and
public road construction led to the fourth wave.57
A. Closing of the Range: Taylor Act of 1934
The Taylor Act reinforced and codified the decline of open range
ranching, which already had fallen into disfavor because of increased farm
settlement encouraged by the homesteading laws.58
At first, public lands were genuinely open; anyone who wanted to graze
his cattle there could do so. But before long, the tragedy of the commons had
begun to manifest itself.59 Overgrazing became a concern, as cattle had to
venture farther and farther from the centerline of the trails to find grass that
had not already been cropped down by previous herds. Even more important,
competition for scarce water resources grew.60 By the end of the 1870s,
54. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 398 (discussing the emergence of feedlots from a
surplus of grain); cf. Brian Sawers, Race and Property After the Civil War: Creating the
Right to Exclude, 87 MISS. L.J. 703, 705 (2018) (noting the effects of closing the range
in the United States were an example of economic change driving legal change, and
property law in particular).
55. Perritt, supra note 3, at 372 (noting that although the second wave ended cattle
drives, it did not end the flow of beef and it channeled production and transportation into
smaller herds); see MARY G. RAMOS, TEXAS ALMANAC, CATTLE DRIVES STARTED IN
EARNESTAFTER THECIVILWAR (1991).
56. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 388–89 (distinguishing Chicago as a hub for
meatpacking and noting that forces of the third wave led to the decentralization of
slaughterhouses and packing houses closer to the markets); Woodard, supra note 41, at
401 (explaining that the farmer’s shift of moving cattle near railroad cities to ship cattle
by rail stimulated the growth of the meatpacking industry; therefore, increasing the
innovation across the country with the need for expanding railroads).
57. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 388–92 (describing the invention of refrigerated truck
technology as delivering efficiencies reflected in the economies of scale); Kaitlyn Trout,
You Can’t Have Your Beef and Eat it Too: The Statutory Effect of Anti-Corporate
Farming Acts on Family Farms and Beef Corporations, 39 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 513,
530 (2014) (stating that the federal highway system’s swift expansion coupled with the
innovation of refrigerated trucks enabled meat packagers to move into rural areas near
the farmers; therefore, reducing costs and industrializing the meatpacking industry).
58. See George Cameron Coggins Margaret, The Law of Public Rangeland
Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 41 (1982)
(explaining that the act “allowed for the withdrawal of unappropriated public domain
into grazing districts” and thus led to the decline of open range ranching).
59. See generally id. (providing background regarding the tragedy of the commons).
60. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 370 (noting that the increase in cattle drives led to
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extralegal mechanisms for enforcing quasi-property rights to the open range
had developed.61 According to law, the cattlemen did not own water rights
or grazing rights in the public land.62 Cattlemen staked claims to regular
pastures and regular water sources.63 The custom of the range induced most
other ranchers to respect those claims.64
As the range grew more crowded, the voluntary respect diminished in
effectiveness, and the ranchers organized associations that formalized the
rules and enforced them. The system was especially complete and rigorous
in Wyoming before statehood. The Wyoming Cattlemen’s Association
controlled the public territorial institutions, including its legislature.65
The use of public lands diminished substantially in the twentieth century
as a result of two political forces leading to legal restrictions.66 The first of
these was the move, stimulated by the dustbowl crisis,67 to the sustainable
overgrazed land and scarcity of food and water for the moving cattle); Russel L. Tanner,
Leasing the Public Range: The Taylor Grazing Act and the BLM, WYOHISTORY.ORG
(Aug. 30, 2015), https://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/leasing-public-range-taylor-
grazing-act-and-blm (describing how grazing habits were primarily first-come-first-
serve: ranchers who first got to the land and water sources ended up controlling these
areas).
61. Perritt, supra note 3, at 410 (noting that open range ranching led to attempts at a
quasi-property regime to reduce disputes); Invention of Improved Barbed Wire Changes
the West, THE HIST. ENGINE, https://historyengine.richmond.edu/episodes/view/6265
(last visited May 31, 2020) (explaining how barbed wire was invented in the 1870s and
used to monitor livestock movement).
62. Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes, & Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider
Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND&WATER L. REV. 581, 652 (1998)
(explaining that “at the beginning of ranching in theWest,” although no rancher had legal
title to the land, he had “range rights,” which were customary rights to water and the
surrounding free range land and were recognized by his neighbors).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Perritt, supra note 3, at 388 n.106 (articulating the way cattlemen pushed for their
own interests through their control of the legislature); see also W. Turrentine Jackson,
The Wyoming Stock Growers’ Association Political Power in Wyoming Territory, 1873-
1890, 33 THE MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 571, 571 (1947) (explaining the role the
Wyoming Stock Growers’ Association held in influencing public territorial institutions).
66. Perritt, supra note 3, at 401 (explaining that property law led to the demise of
open range cattle drives). See generally Adam M. Sowards, Public Lands and Their
Administration, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AM. HIST. (Aug. 2017), https://
oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefo
re-9780199329175-e-396?rskey=fw0XJZ (providing background on the management of
public lands in the twentieth century and the political factors that resulted in a decline of
available public lands).
67. See Michael M. Welsh, Beyond Designed Capture: A Reanalysis of the
Beginnings of Public Range Management, 1928–38, 26 SOCIAL SCI. HIST. 347, 349–51
(2002) (characterizing general academic view that Taylor Act resulted from rancher
concerns about Dust Bowl overgrazing and was intended to ensure that ranchers
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management of public and private agricultural land in the plain states. The
result was the enactment of the Taylor Act in 1934.68 The second, beginning
to be influential about fifty years later, was the environmental movement,
which sought to protect public lands from any kind of private exploitation
that might disturb its beauty or displace native species.69 That movement
continues to gain force in the twenty-first century, reinforced by claims that
current trends and beef husbandry are unsustainable and contribute to global
warming more than petroleum carbon emissions.70
The resulting legal restrictions on the use of public land for grazing have
curtailed the supply of land for grazing, reinforced by denser settlement
throughout the country.71 This reduction in the supply of land coincided with
the continuing increase in the demand for beef.72 The result is that land has
become the dominant factor in beef production. The industry responded by
adopting new technologies and business methods that increased the
efficiency of land cattle production, thereby keeping its cost tolerable.73
Enclosed pastures and feedlots are the manifestations of that response.
B. Corn Surplus
Corn surpluses transformed beef husbandry.74 They made it possible to
controlled range management); see also id. at 354–55 (proposing revised history that
Taylor Act originated in more general concerns about Dust Bowl).
68. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1934).
69. See Karen Klitz & Jeff Miller, Con: Cattle Grazing Is Incompatible with
Conservation, BAY NATURE (May 7, 2015), https://baynature.org/article/con-cattle-
grazing-is-incompatible-with-conservation/.
70. Id.
71. Perritt, supra note 3, at 395–97 (explaining how as settlers increased in number,
so did the frequency of fencing in previously open land); cf. Clarence H. Danhof, The
Fencing Problem in the Eighteen-Fifties, 18 AGRIC. HIST., 168, 173 (1944) (conveying
that in order for settlers to keep their property within their own boundaries, fencing and
private land became necessary for farming).
72. Perritt, supra note 3, at 365 (stating that cattlemen noticed demand for beef
increasing in eastern cities and rushed to meet the demand). See generally Hannah
Ritchie & Max Roser, Meat and Dairy Production, OURWORLD IN DATA (Aug. 2017),
https://ourworldindata.org/meat-production (indicating that global beef production has
doubled from 1961–2014).
73. Perritt, supra note 3, at 392 (stating that as societal changes made “open-range
ranching uneconomical, changes in grain cultivation and production came to the rescue
of the beef industry”). See generally David I. Smith, 19th Century Development of
Refrigeration in the American Meat Packing Industry, 8 TENOR OFOURTIMES 99 (2019)
(stating that new technological advancements, such as refrigerated railway cars, created
a decrease in prices for the cattle industry).
74. See William Trimble, Historical Aspects of the Surplus Food Production of the
United States, 1862–1902, 1 AGRIC. HIST. SOC’Y PAPERS 221, 225 (1921) (explaining
that U.S. corn exports increased by a factor of twelve from 1852 to 1881, but some
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depend less on grass grown on the open range or enclosed pastures and to
feed cattle regardless of the amount or quality of grass available. The corn
surpluses facilitated the adjustment to the closing of the open range because
surpluses reduced the amount of acreage necessary to feed beef cattle.
Typically, a cow-calf pair requires two acres of grassland from time of
breeding to the time the calf is weaned.75 Another one to three acres are
required to finish a steer that is entirely grass-fed.76 By concentrating cattle
in feedlots and feeding them corn instead of grass, the amount of land
required for cattle production is reduced by at least half.77 Corn long had
been used as a feed supplement. For example, in places where winters were
too harsh for the cattle to continue to feed on the open range, cattlemen
supplemented with corn.78 Feedlots are possible, however, only because
enough corn is available to feed cattle in them. Ultimately, corn surpluses
made feedlots possible.
A graph of corn yields from 1866 shows that corn productivity did not
dramatically increase until the late 1930s.79 Productivity is only one aspect
observers put the onset of the corn surplus much later in time); see also Big Nutritional
Changes in Recent History, SLANKERGRASS-FEDMEAT, https://www.texasgrassfedbeef.
com/grass-fed-meat-education/big-nutritional-changes-recent-history (last visited May
31, 2020) (dating corn surplus to use of self-propelled combine beginning with World
War II).
75. See Balancing Your Animals with Your Forage, USDA, https://www.nrcs.
usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb1167344.pdf (last visited May 31, 2020)
(characterizing the acreage required for raising cattle increases considerably on native
grass or in wooded areas); see also Livestock Management, TEXASPARKS ANDWILDLIFE,
https://tpwd.texas.gov/landwater/land/habitats/post_oak/habitat_management/cow/
index.phtml (last visited May 31, 2020) (estimating requirements of 815 acres per cow-
calf unit on native grass, 36 acres on tame pastures, and 5075 acres in wooded areas and
justifying rule of thumb that it takes 1.82.0 acres of grass to feed one cow-calf pair for
12 months).
76. See Greg Halich et al., Producer’s Guide to Pasture-Based Beef Finishing, U. OF
KY. COOPERATIVEEXTENSION SERV. 1, 13 (2015), (suggesting at least one acre per 1,000
steer for finishing; developing overall cost estimate for ranch that finishes steers on
grass).
77. See Corn-Fed: Cows and Corn, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/
kingcorn/cows.html (last visited May 31, 2020) (characterizing the ability of feedlots to
bring cattle to market weight in fifteen months rather than the normal two to three years
for pastured cattle).
78. See id. (reporting that steers were fed corn as a supplement, not as a staple, until
the 1950s); see also Jason Schmidt, Trends in the Production and Marketing of Grass-
fed Beef, KAN. RURAL CTR., http://old.kansasruralcenter.org/publications/CCCSchmidt
GrassFedBeef.pdf (last visited May 31, 2020) (characterizing 1916 as a time of grass-
fed in summer and grain-fed in winter and 1950s when “subsidized grain led to
dominance of the feedlot industry”).
79. A Brief History of U.S. Corn, in One Chart, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/08/16/a-brief-history-of-u-s-
corn-in-one-chart/?utm_term=.dc82644fc264.
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of corn supply, however. “For most of the nineteenth century, American
farmers were able to produce more and more food by planting on ever more
acreage.”80
This also increased the supply.81 Supply and demand fluctuated,
producing surpluses in some years and not in others.82 Where there was a
surplus, a farmer could feed it to stock or let it rot — there were not markets
developed for other uses — such as fuel — until a century later.83
C. Railroad Rigidities
Overcoming the inherent rigidities of the rail infrastructure was a
centerpiece of the third wave. The rail infrastructure retarded adaptation to
new technologies in beef production. The spine of the rail network served
long cattle drives and centralized slaughtering and packing operations in a
few hubs, mainly Chicago.84
Rail transportation is among the most capital-intensive industries that
exist.85 Most of the capital goes into acquiring the right-of-way, surveying
the route, and constructing the track.86 Thereafter, the additional capital
outlays are necessary to maintain the track and purchase locomotives and
other rolling stock. Rarely is it cost-effective or possible to rip up the track
on an existing right-of-way and substitute a railroad running elsewhere, as
land-use patterns change.87 The capital simply is not available for such
80. Id.; see Philip D. Hubbs, The Origins and Consequences of the American Feedlot
System 2 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Baylor University) (reporting on how
improved agricultural technology, chiefly steel-bladed plow and mechanical reaper led
to corn surplus).
81. See Hubbs, supra note 80, at 2 (explaining that several inventions allowed for
larger pieces of land to be effectively utilized, allowing food production to rise).
82. Id. at 6–7.
83. History of Ethanol Production and Policy, N.D. STATE UNIVERSITY,
https://www.ag.ndsu.edu/energy/biofuels/energy-briefs/history-of-ethanol-production-
and-policy (last visited May 31, 2020) (characterizing corn ethanol production as
beginning in the 1970s during the fuel crisis due to high fuel costs).
84. SeeHubbs, supra note 80, at 21–22 (explaining that spine of the rail network had
been constructed to serve larger purposes, and the expansion of the railroad allowed
ranchers to not have to drive their cattle to Kansas to a railyard).
85. Matt Wilson, The Resurgence of Railroads, CAPITAL GROUP, https://www.
capitalgroup.com/content/dam/cgc/tenants/pcs/images/Perspective-
Images/Quarterly%20Insights/Summer%202015%20Quarterly_Insights.pdf (last
visited Dec. 29, 2019) ( “Rail is one of the most capital-intensive industries, with nearly
one-fifth of revenue going toward [maintenance] . . . .”).
86. See Martha Lawrence, Railways Are the Future—So How Can Countries
Finance Them?, WORLD BANK BLOG (Feb. 22, 2018), https://blogs.worldbank.org/
transport/railways-are-future-so-how-can-countries-finance-them.
87. See CURTISA. MORGAN ET AL., RAIL RELOCATION PROJECTS IN THEU.S.: CASE
STUDIES AND LESSONS FOR TEXAS RAIL PLANNING 25 (2006) (explaining the costs of
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purposes after initial construction is complete. A railroad, once established,
may run additional branch lines to tap new sources of traffic.88
At the turn of the twentieth century, the architecture of the rail network
was fixed.89 It was a hub and spoke system.90 As it pertains to the beef
industry, the hubs were in Chicago, Kansas City, and Omaha. The spokes
radiated out from those hubs through the West with major facilities for live
cattle loading at a few railheads such as Dodge City, Ogallala, Cheyenne,
and Miles City.
New technologies made it possible — and sometimes forced —
decentralization of ranching and beef packing, it was difficult for the
railroads to adapt.91 Decentralization of ranching meant that cattle were
raised in much smaller herds dispersed throughout the cattle-raising states.92
While the railroads could, and sometimes did, run branch lines to establish
railheads in remote places, the economics of the strategy were not good;
rarely did the density of cattle loadings cover the capital cost of the branch
line.93 It is now commonplace in transportation economics to understand
that the “granger lines,” in building out to less dense territories sealed their
fate and assured their eventual doom because the traffic could not support
their networks.94
railroad relocation).
88. See I.E. Quastler, A Descriptive Model of Railroad Network Growth in the
American Midwest, 1865-1915, 77 ELECTRONIC J. GEOGRAPHY 87, 92 (1978) (providing
three “causes” for adding branch lines, including the “widespread belief that local firms
could provide effective competition to the major railroads . . . incentive . . . to ship and
receive” for speed and cost efficiency, and adding lines for exhaustible resources).
89. See Julie A. Hogeland, An Application of Steindl’s Theory of Concentration to
the U.S. Meat Packing Industry, 1895-1988, 32, 33–34, in RETHINKING CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF JOSEF STEINDL (Tracy Mott & Nina
Shapiro eds., 2005).
90. See id.
91. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 390 (describing how using this technology to
revolutionize the food industry further necessitated someone to take the risk of a
substantial investment); John M. Thies, Decentralization in the Meat Packing Industry,
1 KANSAS STATE U. 1, 2–3 (1965) (noting that changes in technological process had an
important influence on decentralization).
92. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 399 (stating that decentralization of the smaller herds
were linked directly to regional slaughterhouses and supermarkets by independent
truckers); see alsoMary Hendrickson, Creating Alternatives: A Participant Observer’s
Reflections on the Emerging Local Food System in Kansas City, 24 SOUTHERN RURAL
SOC. 169, 178 (2009) (understanding agricultural alternatives to old methods of farming
and the benefits associated with them).
93. See Margaret Walsh, Reviews, 7 J. AM. STUD. 108, 109 (1973) (describing how
“a wide disparity developed between the income and the investment needs of the
railroads”).
94. See SOLON JUSTUS BUCK, THE GRANGER MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF
AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION AND ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
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So, for time, ranchers either did not decentralize their ranching operations
as much as they would like, sticking close to the established trailheads, or
they did decentralize them and incurred the cost of driving the cattle from
the new, smaller, ranches to the existing railheads.95 All the time, they
complained loudly about the poor service they received from the railroads,
as part of the Granger Movement.96
The evolving regulatory regime under the Interstate Commerce
Commission (“ICC”) further impeded adaptation.97 While the Interstate
Commerce Act popularly is perceived as a consumer-oriented (or shipper-
oriented) strategy to restrain monopolistic rate increases, its economic and
legislative history shows that it was mainly intended to prevent ruinous
competition by placing a floor under rates and limiting market entry.98 Thus,
when a railroad decided it was economical to run a new branch line into
growing beef ranching territory, opponents of that new transportation
competition could block it through the ICC.99 Similarly, if a railroad decided
it wanted to lower rates to increase traffic and make an existing line pay,
anticompetitive forces acting through the ICC could block that rate
reduction.100
Other aspects of railroad technology interfered with adaptation as well.101
Not only did the capital intensity of constructing a railroad right-of-way and
maintaining it require a certain level of traffic density to provide a reasonable
rate of return, but the capital intensity of locomotives made it profitable only
when the locomotive pulled a substantial string of cars. Nowhere was it
profitable for a locomotive to pick up a single car and haul it all the way to
MANIFESTATIONS 1870-1880 164 (1913).
95. See J. C. Swanson & J. Morrow-Tesch, Cattle Transport: Historical, Research,
& Future Perspectives, 79 J. ANIMAL SCI. (E. SUPPL.) E102, E103 (2001) ].
96. See Martin Ridge, Ignatius Donnelly and the Granter Movement in Minnesota,
42 MISS. VALLEYHIST. REV. 693, 703–08 (1956) (describing Granger Movement’s focus
on legislative railroad regulation).
97. See Federal Supervision of Railroad Passenger Service: The Sunset Case, Dawn
of a New Era or Monument to the Old?, 1970 DUKE L. REV. 529, 529–30 (1970)
(explaining how the Interstate Commerce Commission has played a role in impeding
development by intentionally downgrading services).
98. Marg A. Wallace, Interstate Commerce Commission, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
937, 959 (1988) (contending that government must encourage “reasonable rates for
transportation” yet mitigate “unfair” and “destructive” competition).
99. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism
and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1023 (1988) (stating that regulations can
control market entry and thus restrict competition).
100. See id..
101. Cattle Car, AMERICAN-RAILS, https://www.american-rails.com/cattle.html (last
visited Dec. 27, 2019).
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its destination.102 The labor cost of engine and train crews, inflated through
most of the twentieth century by state “full crew” laws103 and by collective
bargaining agreements,104 exacerbated the economic disadvantage of moving
small trains, even as the locomotive enabled pulling longer ones.
The necessity of running longer trains added to the obstacles to adaptation.
Unless traffic density is very high, a railroad cannot assemble a long train
unless it comprises cars headed for different destinations.105 That means that
each car has to pass through a succession of classification yards — nodes in
the rail network that disassemble inbound trains, aggregate the cars from
them going in the same direction, and assemble those cars into another
outbound train headed in the general direction of the destinations for the cars.
Then, the process is repeated so that the number of cars comprising a train
that reaches a particular destination is of efficient length.
Each stop in the classification yards results in delay, usually a day or more
to match up inbound trains with outbound trains. The delays often are
increased by railroad “blocking” strategies that do not let a train leave the
terminal until it has some minimum number of cars.106 Even when the
railroad tracks go to the right places, pickups and deliveries often are delayed
because of the need for local trains to have a minimum number of cars to be
economic.107 No trainmaster sends a locomotive with an engine and train
crew out to pick up a single car from the shipper and bring it back to the
terminal if he can help it.
Semitrailer trucks encounter no such inefficiencies; a driver is happy to
take the tractor to an origin and pick up a single semitrailer with a load and
drive it directly to its destination and drop it off.
D. Trucks and Roadbuilding Flexibilities
Trucks and highways enabled the beef industry to decentralize. By 1920,
102. See id. (contending that railroads experienced a downfall in part because
shipping costs could not be justified for small transport loads).
103. See Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R.R.
Co., 393 U.S. 129, 130 (1968) (describing history of state full-crew laws).
104. See Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 330 F. Supp. 646, 648–
49 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (issuing injunction against rail union for refusing to negotiate over
crew consist dispute; union insisted on adherence to national pattern of collective
agreements).
105. See Ravindra Ahuja, Krishna Jha, & Jian Liu, Solving Real-Life Railroad
Blocking Problems, 37 INTERFACES 404, 405 (5th ed. 2007), https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/220249980_Solving_Real-Life_Railroad_Blocking_Problems
(explaining the use of classification cars in railways).
106. See, e.g., id. at 406 (purporting to mitigate delays seen in assembling railway
cars).
107. See id. (identifying delays in railways).
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automobile and truck technology had progressed to the point where trucks
had sufficient capacity to provide interesting alternatives to drives of live
cattle on foot and rail transport over short distances.108The limiting factor
was the inadequacy of roads more than shortcomings of the vehicles.109
The trucking revolution in transportation differed from the railroad
revolution almost a century earlier.110 The infrastructure for both was built
with public funds and subject to shifting political alliances and budget
crises.111 But the railroads, with few and short-lived exceptions, were private
sector projects, in which the same corporate entities build the infrastructure
and operated the vehicles that ran on it.112 Road-building was different.
Almost all the significant roads after World War I were built by the public
sector and remained in governmental hands for operation and
maintenance.113 Others, in the private sector, decided whether to run vehicles
on the highway and defined their own purposes. The infrastructure and the
vehicles were as firmly inter-dependent as in the case of railroads, but the
centers of decision-making were different.114 When the two were not
congruent, governments built highways that were little used, and vehicle
owners continued to suffer from an inadequate road network going to where
they wanted to go.115
i. Roadbuilding
Construction of good public roads and truck technology to take advantage
of them to haul cattle were defining features of the third wave.116 The
technology of roadbuilding advanced considerably in the nineteenth
108. See AMERICAN-RAILS, supra note 101 (contending that trucks were more
desirable than railways for cattle transport).
109. See id. (contending that the highway improvements led to a more widespread use
of trucks for cattle drives).
110. Daniel Sweeny, The Structure of Transp. Revolutions, UNIVERSITY OF WASH.
(last modified Jan. 12, 2005), http://staff.washington.edu/jbs/itrans/charge20.htm
(explaining the process of the transportation revolution in the United States).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Rickie Longfellow, Back in Time: The Nat’l Road,U.S.DEP’TOFTRANSP.: FED.
HIGHWAY ADMIN. (last modified June 27, 2017), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
infrastructure/back0103.cfm (explaining the creation and development of roads in the
United States).
114. Sweeny, supra note 110.
115. Id.
116. Kathy Weiser, The Nat’l Road-The First Highway in America, LEGENDS OF
AMERICA (last modified July 2019), https://www.legendsofamerica.com/ah-national
road/ (describing how the first national road was developed and the types of roads that
existed in the nineteenth century).
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century.117 John McAdam proposed improvements in English roads
beginning in 1810, based on raising the roads above ground level, cambering
their surface convexly (curving it, with a peak on the centerline, to facilitate
drainage, and layered construction with stone slabs at the bottom and crushed
rock over it).118
Despite the name “macadam,” the idea of putting tar or asphalt on the
surface came later, in 1901.119 The problem it sought to solve was the
extraction of dust and other small particles from gravel road by the
aerodynamic wake of fast-moving automobiles.120 Eventually, these vehicle
dust tails destroyed the integrity of McAdam-designed roads.121 Roads
paved with tar or asphalt did not suffer from this deficiency.122 Asphalt,
derived from petroleum, and mixed with aggregate, generally replaced tar,
which was derived from coal, by 1920.123
Technologies for road construction, enabling road graders and other earth-
moving equipment, also were developed during this period.124 Before 1920,
most country roads were built and maintained by private property owners.125
They granted easements across their own property — or tolerated easements
— to allow others to pass on the roadway.126 If usage and the cost of
maintenance were too much, the landowner would charge a toll.127 The
tragedy of the commons did not develop because the servient tenement for
the easements were always in private hands, subject to the power to
117. Sweeny, supra note 110.
118. Christopher McFadden, John Loudon McAdam: The Father of the Mod. Road,
INTERESTING ENGINEERING (Oct. 26, 2017), https://interestingengineering.com/john-
loudon-mcadam-the-father-of-the-modern-road.
119. See U.S. Patent No. 765,975 (filed Nov. 3, 1902) (claiming apparatus for
improving the preparation of tar-soaked gravel).




124. See U.S. Patent No. 823,872 (filed Aug. 29, 1905) (claiming a cutting and
scraping blade combined with a compacting roller, mounted on the same horse-drawn
frame).
125. Stephen Mihm, Privatizing Roads Was A Great Idea. Not Anymore.,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 7, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/
2018-02-07/privatizing-roads-was-a-great-idea-not-anymore (commenting on the
reasons that road privatization was not beneficial in the history of the United States).
126. Daniel B. Klein & John Majewski, Turnpikes and Toll Roads in Nineteenth-
Century America, ECON. HISTORY ASS’N, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/turnpikes-and-toll-
roads-in-nineteenth-century-america/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) (describing how
privatization of roads was a business and collecting tolls was necessary to finance road
maintenance).
127. Mihm, supra note 125.
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exclude.128 Farmers and small-town residents resisted governmental
roadbuilding programs129 because of concern about taxes,130 and because
making roadbuilding decisions at the township, county, or state level
threatened an ideology of democratic autonomy.131
Opposition to the results of this decentralized system gradually developed
through the second half of the nineteenth century132 and intensified with the
availability of better grading machinery,133 better technologies for the roads
themselves,134 the bicycle craze with its organized advocacy,135 and the
widespread adoption of the automobile.136 States slowly overcame farmer
opposition and experimented with a variety of subsidies from higher levels
of government, especially for trunk roads, leaving most local autonomy
intact.137 One result was the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916.138
Throughout the 1920s, road building and road paving programs advanced
on the agendas of state and county governments. Persuading local and state
governments to engage in roadbuilding was a nontrivial accomplishment.
Significant doubts existed as to the constitutional power of states to fund
internal improvements. This constitutional question had not stopped canal-
building and railroad building projects, but the argument remained available
for anyone who opposed improving the roads. The Great Depression,
beginning in 1929, deflated economic activity, but roadbuilding involved
128. Klein, supra note 126.
129. Hal S. Barron, And the Crooked Shall Be Made Straight: Public Road
Administration and the Decline of Localism in the Rural North, 1870-1930, 26 J. SOCIAL
HIST. 81, 88 (1992).
130. Id. (explaining that local roadbuilding programs let farmers work on roads they
cared about the most and to satisfy obligations by using their own labor, teams, and tools;
paying taxes was only a default).
131. Id. at 81.
132. Id. at 83–86 (describing the increasing calls for better finance and planning with
respect to roads).
133. Id. at 86–87 (showing picture of “Champion Road Grader, 1886”).
134. Id. at 87 (describing movements to “macadamize” trunk roads).
135. See id. at 88 (describing “League of American Wheelmen” — “19th century
Yuppies” — activities in 1899 and 1900); see also Richard F. Weingroff, Highway
Existence: 100 Years and Beyond, A Peaceful Campaign of Progress and Reform : The
Federal Highway Administration at 100, U.S.DEP’T OFTRANSP. FED. HIGHWAYADMIN.,
[hereinafter Highway Existence] https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/
93fall/p93au1.cfm (last modified Jan. 31, 2017) (describing bicycle campaign for
improved roads).
136. Barron, supra note 129, at 94–95 (describing effect of automobile advocates after
First World War, into the 1920s).
137. Id. at 89–93.
138. Id. at 93–94.
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publicly funded jobs and thus suffered less.139
The first serious campaign to build a national system of national paved
roads began in 1912 under the leadership of Carl Fisher, an entrepreneur in
the automobile industry, based in Detroit.140 Fisher was charismatic and had
a good sense of showmanship.141 He recruited effective public relations
professionals and held meetings with businessmen around the country,
promoting “Lincoln Highway,” a paved road that would run from coast to
coast.142 Although the Lincoln Highway was “dedicated” in 1913, less than
half of it was paved at that time, and a trip from New York to the West Coast
on it took twenty to thirty days.143
Fisher and his allies got the Lincoln Highway built, by cajoling one state
and county government after another to improve roads and to connect
them.144 Bridge-building was one of the more challenging parts of the effort
because of its cost. The Lincoln Highway is today’s U.S. Route 30, and its
path is mostly followed by Interstate 80.145
Fisher, and the other advocates of government support for roadbuilding,
understood that the automobile industry would benefit especially from better
roads; if people could go somewhere conveniently, they would buy more
cars. As early as the 1920s, the industry had become sufficiently invested in
the project and began lobbying against mass transit facilities such as
streetcars and suburban trolleys.146
In 1926, state and federal lawmakers established a Joint Board to facilitate
a national roadbuilding effort.147 The Board had no regulatory authority or
funding capacity, but it successfully coordinated the implementation of a
national system for numbering highways.
The United States Bureau of Public Roads was established in 1918,
initially as a part of the USDA, and subsequently absorbed into the Federal
Highway Administration, in 1970.148 The Bureau of Public Roads provided
139. LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41017, JOB CREATION PROGRAMS OF
THEGREATDEPRESSION: THEWPA AND THE CCC 4 (2010).
140. Richard F. Weingroff, The Lincoln Highway, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED.





144. Id. (emphasizing that as late as 1921, only eight percent of U.S. roads were




148. Highway Existence, supra note 135.
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limited federal subsidies for specific highway projects such as bridges and
tunnels.149
The federal Government involvement intensified during the New Deal
when the Works Progress Administration used federal dollars to put people
to work building aspects of the highway infrastructure.150
In 1918, Dwight D. Eisenhower, then a lieutenant colonel in the army,
participated in a trans-continental Army excursion on public roads, aimed at
building public support for a road improvement program.151
By the outbreak of World War II, it was possible to go almost anywhere
in the settled part of the United States by automobile or truck on paved
roads.152 Still, the difficulty of passing slower traffic on two-lane roads and
the delays occasioned by stoplights and stop signs at the proliferating number
of intersections limited capacity of the highway infrastructure.153
In 1913, federal subsidies began with the Post Office Appropriation Bill,
which included $500,000 for an experimental post road program.154 In 1916
President Woodrow Wilson signed the Bankhead Bill, beginning the
Federal-Aid Highway Program.155
Federal-Aid Highway Program funding increased in 1919, but the states
responded sluggishly. In 1921, legislation addressed the major concerns
149. Richard F. Weingroff, Milestones for U.S. Highway Transportation and the
Federal Highway Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/96spring/p96sp44.cfm (last
modified Jan. 31, 2017). See generally Richard F. Weingroff, From 1916 to 1939: The
Federal-State Partnership at Work, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/96summer/p96su7.cfm (last
modified Jan. 31, 2017) (discussing the federal aid highway program); Federal Highway
Administration, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Highway_Admin
istration (showing from 1917 to 1941 261,000 miles of highways were built with Federal
aid of $3.17 billion, with state and local governments providing another $2.14 billion).
150. The Works Progress Administration, PBS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/surviving-the-dust-bowl-works-
progress-administration-wpa/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2019).
151. Elliott Carter, Dwight Eisenhower Was Along for the Ride from Washington to
San Francisco, WASH. POST, (July 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/
2019/07/07/driving-cross-country-was-crazy-idea-an-army-convoy-set-out-show-it-
could-be-done/.
152. Richard F. Weingroff, Before the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956: Francis v.
Du Pont In Context, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://www.
fhwa.dot.gov/highwayhistory/dupont.pdf.
153. Richard F. Weingroff, Federal Aid Road Act of 1916: Building the Foundation,
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAYADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/
publicroads/96summer/p96su2.cfm (last modified Jan. 31, 2017).
154. Highway Existence, supra note 135.
155. Id.
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about the Federal-Aid Highway Program.156 “The proposal retained the
federal-aid principle, but satisfied supporters of long-distance roads by
restricting funds to a federal-aid system, to be linked at state lines . . . and
requiring that paved surfaces should be at least eighteen feet wide.”157
By the early 1930s, the United States received many proposals to create a
network of highways. 158 President Franklin D. Roosevelt was enthusiastic
about the potential highway systems because the project would create jobs.159
Section 13 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1938 tasked the Bureau of
Public Roads with making a study of needs and producing a corresponding
report entitled Toll Roads and Free Roads.160 The report’s “A Master Plan
for Free Highway Development,” “called for a 26,700-mile non-toll network,
with routes identified on the basis of statewide surveys showing where traffic
volumes were highest.”161
WorldWar I turned national attention to other matters, but Congress called
for a “national expressway study” in 1943 by amending the Federal-Aid
Highway Act.162 In 1944 President Franklin Roosevelt sent
the Interregional Highways report to Congress recommending increasing
the rural and urban highway network.163
The Federal-Aid Highway Act was again expanded in 1944, to include
the National System of Interstate Highways.164 The 1944 expansion granted
states the authority to determine routes with federal approval but failed to
allocate funds to the expanded network.165 Three years later, in 1947, the
Public Roads Administration announced its plan for the 37,700 mile National
System of Interstate Highways.166
Construction of the system required strong national leadership to fund it.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower provided that leadership.167 Eisenhower
contrasted his experience in 1918 with his experience at the end of World
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what became the Interstate Highway System, beginning with his signing of
the National Aid Highway Act of 1956 as he was running for reelection.169
Meanwhile, truck technology was advancing, with bigger diesel engines
and sturdier semitrailers. Large trucks on interstate highways were superior
to trains of eighty cattle cars confined to fixed right-of-way and having to
pass through fixed classification yards to beef packing hubs.170 Now, a cattle
rancher or beef packer could arrange for point-to-point transportation of live
cattle or process beef directly from ranches or feedlots to slaughterhouses
and directly from slaughterhouses to packers and on to retailers or
consumers.171
ii. Trucks
Good roads had little impact without vehicles to travel on them. Any
vehicle must be designed around the loads it is intended to carry. The
propulsion system must deliver enough power to pull the load, the body of
the vehicle must be adequate to contain the load, shield it from the elements,
and to tolerate opposing forces of friction and drag and those exerted by the
propulsion system.172 These basic principles determine whether the vehicle
is a semi-trailer truck, a freight wagon pulled by oxen, a railroad train, or an
aircraft.
Early attempts to use steam engines on roads were unsuccessful because
the weight of the engine necessary to pull an acceptable load was too great
for the roads to bear.173 Once the basics of internal combustion engines,
clutches, and transmissions had been worked out,174 it was not much of a
challenge for engineers to put a truck body — not much more than a wagon
bed — on the back of a passenger car, turning it into a truck.
Farmers were receptive. Before automobiles and trucks became common,
farmers were using a variety of small internal combustion engines for farm
tasks such as running cotton gins, pumping water, churning butter, threshing
169. The Interstate Highway System, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/us-
states/interstate-highway-system. (last modified Jun. 7, 2019).
170. Hubbs, supra note 80, at 62.
171. See id. (asserting that flexibility of truck transportation facilitated establishment
of modern feedlot system).
172. See Vehicle Propulsion, SCIENCEDAILY, http://www.sciencedaily.com/terms/
vehicle_propulsion.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) (explaining the propulsion system
and how it relates to engines and power).
173. Merrill J. Roberts, The Motor Transportation Revolution, 30 BUS. HIST. REV. 57,
57–58 (1956).
174. See id. at 58 (noting that not only internal combustion engines, but also
transmissions, clutches, and differentials were necessary developments); see also
HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 45–46 (identifying key technology developments that made
agricultural trucking feasible).
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grain, and washing clothes.175 Cattle farmers were among the earliest
adopters of truck technology.176
Reliable data on the price of truck tractors during the first half of the
twentieth century is not available. The price of farm tractors is available;
however, and farm tractors and truck tractors are not too different in basic
capability, although they look quite different. Early gasoline-powered
tractors became available soon after 1900, led by the Fordson.177 The tractors
weighed between 2,000 and 3,000 pounds and cost just under $1,000.178 By
1920, Ford cut the price of the Fordson from $625 to $395, and International
Harvester followed suit.179 Horses and mules still predominated over tractors
until about 1944, however.180
For the most part, trucks are intended to take one trailer load of freight
from an origin directly to a destination.181 The ideal size truck for
transporting live cattle from cow-calf farm to feedlot or from feedlot to the
slaughterhouse is usually the biggest allowed by traffic laws. Further, the
ideal truck to transport live cattle accommodates multiple beeves, giving
them adequate ventilation, water, and physical support so they do not fall
while in transit.
The ideal size truck for transporting sides of beef from slaughterhouses to
packing plants is one that is designed to pull carcass that fully utilizes the
available volume allowed by traffic laws. Likewise, trucks designed to carry
frozen beef packages from the packinghouses to retailers or customers
should be designed so that the volume of the trailer can be fully utilized, with
the tractor whose tractive effort is sufficient to pull the corresponding
weight.182
175. William J. White, Economic History of Tractors in the United States, EH NET
(Mar. 26, 2008), https://eh.net/encyclopedia/economic-history-of-tractors-in-the-united-
states/ (describing the early uses of tractors by farmers in the United States).
176. See HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 59.
177. SeeWhite, supra note 175 (describing the Fordson model).
178. See id.
179. See id. (discussing how Ford initiated a price war with competitors after
experiencing a “drastic” drop in sales).
180. Id.
181. Truckload vs. Less Than Truckload: What’s the Difference?, FREIGHTQUOTE,
https://www.freightquote.com/blog/less-than-truckload-vs-truckload-freight-whats-the-
difference (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) (noting that less-than-truckload operations exist
and they require terminals at which trailers can be unloaded and reloaded, a classification
process not unlike that performed by rail classification yards, except at the package level
rather than at the truckload or carload level).
182. Transporting Meat and Poultry, THE MEAT WE EAT, https://meatscience.org/
TheMeatWeEat/topics/article/2017/05/30/transporting-meat-and-poultry (last visited
Dec. 28, 2019).
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In all cases, truck trailer size should be large enough such that transporting
output away from an operation does not interpose a bottleneck, but not so
large that utilization suffers from a trailer sitting around waiting to be filled
because the production line represents a bottleneck.183
Daimler Motors, an early innovator in the cattle transportation business,
listed the key truck technology developments as including: sectional steel
frames and cast steel wheels, upright valves and pinions instead of belt drive,
pneumatic tires, and diesel engines.184
The first production truck from Chevrolet, a one-ton truck introduced in
1918, was inspired by vehicles used in plants to move parts and pieces from
place to place.185 In the simplest terms, this is an example of form follows
function. It was a rolling chassis featuring an open cab, an inline four-
cylinder engine, and an open frame allowing customers to install the body
that fit their unique needs. Later developments included drum and disk
brakes.186
The “semi-truck” originated in as early as 1898 and aimed at hauling
newly manufactured automobiles to their customers.187 Before long, Charles
Fruehauf and John Endebrock, inventors of the semi-trailer and train mobile,
improved the design and structures for special purpose trailers, separate from
the tractors that pulled them.188 Fruehauf developed refrigerated trailers in
183. How to Make a Successful Trucking Company: 7 Steps, COMMERCIAL CAPITAL
LLC, https://www.comcapfactoring.com/blog/how-to-make-a-successful-trucking-
company-one-important-tip/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2019).
184. Prime Movers: Milestones of the Mercedes-Benz Truck History from 1896 to the
Present Day, DAIMLER, https://www.daimler.com/company/tradition/truck-milestones
.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2019) (listing milestones in the history of truck technology,
such as six-cylinder diesel truck engines producing 120 horsepower in 1939).
185. Dale Wickell, Classic Chevy Trucks: 1918–1959, LIVEABOUTDOTCOM (last
modified June 21, 2018), https://www.liveabout.com/classic-chevy-trucks-1918-1959-
3273701.
186. Isuzu Trucks Evolution of Truck Tech: Past, Present and Future, ISUZUTRUCKS
BLOG ( Mar. 15, 2019), http://content.isuzu.com.au/industry-insights/evolution-of-truck-
tech-past-present-future/.
187. The History of the Semi Truck, EVAN TRANSPORTATION, INC., https://www.
evantransportation.com/blog/semi-trucks/the-history-of-the-semi-truck/ [hereinafter
History of the Semi Truck] (last visited Dec. 28, 2019). But see Roberts, supra note 173,
at 60 (noting that semi-trailer and pneumatic tire were innovations from the First World
War period).
188. History of the Semi Truck, supra note 187; The History of Semi Trailer Trucks,
GREAT WESTERN TRANSPORTATION, https://www.gwtrans.com/the-history-of-semi-
trailer-trucks/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2019); Truck Comprising Tractor and Semi-Trailer,
U.S. Patent No. US3718346A (issued Feb. 27, 1973); Tractor and Trailer Construction,
U.S. Patent No. 2126819A, (issued Aug. 16, 1938) (providing for increased loads within
dimensional limitation of law by adding axle to trailer).
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the 1920s with capacities of either four or six tons.189
In 1904 only 700 trucks were operating.190 That number expanded to
25,000 in 1914 and exploded to 416,569 in 1924.191 By 1936 a three axle192
payload of ten tons was common, compared with fifty-five horsepower
carbureted engines in 1926. Market penetration by trucks was dramatic. In
1936, trucks hauled fifty-five percent of cattle to public stockyards. In 1939,
sixty percent arrived by truck; 1949, seventy-five percent; and by 1960,
ninety percent.193
E. Modal Economics
The production functions for truck and rail transportation are dramatically
different. Capital costs for constructing a new line of railroad are huge,
compared to the capital costs for an entrepreneur wishing to enter the
trucking business.194 This is not because it costs more to build a good
railroad than to build a good highway; the opposite may be true.195 But the
difference in business economics is that the cost of railroad infrastructure is
born by private enterprise, while building road networks has consistently
been a task of the public sector.196
189. Scott Mall, Flashback Friday: Fruehauf Trailers Changed Trucking Forever in
Freight Waves, FREIGHT WAVES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.freightwaves.com/news/
economics/flashback-friday-fruehauf-trailers-changed-trucking-forever.
190. Jerry Spelic, The Early History of Semi-Trucks, PARTNERSHIP (June 15, 2016),
https://www.partnership.com/blog/post/the-early-history-of-semi-trucks.
191. See id.
192. See Traffic Monitoring Guide, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/tmguide/tmg_2013/vehicle-types.cfm
(last visited Dec. 28, 2019) (describing a three-axle vehicle as two axles on the tractor,
one on the semi-trailer).
193. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 66.
194. See COMMERCIAL CAPITAL LLC, supra note 183 (describing various issues and
costs to entering truck business).
195. Alan Kandel, Rails vs Roads for Value, Utilization, Emissions-Savings:
Difference Like Night and Day, AIR QUALITY MATTERS (Jan. 11, 2014),
https://alankandel.scienceblog.com/2014/01/11/rails-vs-roads-for-value-utilization-
emissions-savings-difference-like-night-and-day/ (dictating costs in both mass transit
and highway construction).
196. To be sure, much of the backbone of the real network was built with public
funding in the form of land grants and government bonds, but the private, profit-seeking,
railroads ultimately had to pay for it. This was not the case for trucking enterprises. To
be sure, the truckers had to pay road taxes, usually in the form of fuel taxes, but the
aggregate of those taxes never came close to amortizing the cost of the roads they drove
their trucks on. See William R. Childs, How Public and Private Enterprise Have Built
American Infrastructure, ORIGINS (Oct. 2017), https://origins.osu.edu/article/how-
public-and-private-enterprise-have-built-american-infrastructure (noting how public and
private enterprise have contributed to roadways and railroads).
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Not only that, but the relationship between fixed and variable costs is also
quite different between the two modes. The minimum economic size of a
locomotive is much greater in terms of weight and horsepower — and
therefore cost197 — than the minimum economic size of a truck tractor.198
This was especially true in the steam locomotive era. Experiments with
steam tractors and other steam-driven road vehicles showed that steam
engines were not feasible for these smaller vehicles.
On the other hand, a locomotive of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century could pull twenty to forty cars at a time.199 So the cost of movement
— a variable cost — per railcar as part of a reasonably sized freight train was
much less than the cost of moving a truck trailer, each of which required its
own truck tractor.200 This cost advantage was offset by disadvantages
associated with local freight car collection and distribution and by
classification yard costs and delays, as discussed in Section III.C.
But the basic differences in cost structure for the two modes gave trucks a
considerable advantage for collecting cattle from geographically dispersed
locations and collecting processed beef from geographically dispersed
processing plants. The retail part of the market and the distributors that fed
it were geographically decentralized until the late twentieth century, and so
trucks also presented an advantage for serving the retail distribution
market.201
F. Timing of the Drivers
Distinguishing the four waves requires paying careful attention to the
timings of the different drivers.
Land-use frictions already were discouraging open range ranching and
197. At the turn of twentieth century, the price for new locomotives was between $20
per pound for “catalog” locomotives and $40 per pound for custom locomotives.
Locoi1sa, Comment to Price of Steam Locomotives Circa 1920’s, MODEL RAILROADER
(Jan. 13. 2012, 12:16 PM), http://cs.trains.com/mrr/f/13/t/213759.aspx. A 4-4-0
locomotive at the turn of the century weighed 124,000 pounds. So, the price for a
standard locomotive would have been approximately $250,000. See 4-4-0 “American
or Eight-Wheeler” Type, MENDOCINO COAST MODEL R.R. & HISTORICAL SOC’Y,
https://www.mendorailhistory.org/1_railroads/locos/4-4-0.htm (last visited Dec. 28,
2019).
198. See supra Part III(D)(2) (stating the cost of a farm tractor at the turn of the
twentieth century was about $1,000 for a weight of 2,000-3,000 pounds); see alsoWhite,
supra note 175 (noting the cost of a farm tractor at the turn of the twentieth century to be
approximately $1,000).
199. About the Engines, R.R. EMPIRE, http://www.therailroadempire.com/about
theengines (last visited Sept. 28, 2019) (noting weight each popular steam engine was
capable of pulling).
200. See COMMERCIALCAPITAL LLC, supra note 183.
201. Spelic, supra note 190.
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long cattle drives by 1890.202 These frictions continued and intensified
throughout the twentieth century and were reinforced by the Taylor Act in
1935, which illuminated free grazing on public lands.203 Fragmented land
ownership, encouraged by the homesteading acts, railroads, and promoters
of towns and cities204 resulted in more enclosure, fencing cattle out. In the
second quarter of the twentieth century, environmental concerns became
more influential.205 These concerns pushed feedlots away from population
centers.
Agricultural productivity increased greatly in the twentieth century,
resulting in corn surpluses which made corn attractive to feed cattle in
confined feedlots.206 The popularization of the farm tractor, the reaper, and
other harvesting began in the mid-twentieth century but did not make an
impact until after the Second World War.207
Trucking emerged as an alternative to rail transportation for short
distances in the 1920s.208 Roadway transportation rapidly expanded with
improvements in truck technology and roadbuilding, while the railroads ran
into economic and regulatory difficulties causing them to reduce their
capabilities.209 Roadbuilding began to make a difference by the 1930s, but
202. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 361; see Kelsea Kenzy Sutton, Comment, The Beef
with Big Meat: Meatpacking and Antitrust in America’s Heartland, 58 S.D. L. REV. 611,
630 (2013) (considering the impact of the meatpacking industry and the dramatic
changes to the American food system because of land use protocol).
203. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1934).
204. The Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, especially, was active in encouraging
agriculture in Nebraska. It introduced alfalfa cultivation and improved seeds for the
crops and held seminars on best agricultural practices. It hired recruiters to work in
Eastern states and Europe to induce immigrants to come to Nebraska.
205. See Klitz & Miller, supra note 69.
206. See Trimble, supra note 74, at 225 (explaining that U.S. corn exports increased
by a factor of twelve from 1852 to 1881, but some observers put the onset of the corn
surplus much later in time); see also SLANKERGRASS-FEDMEAT, supra note 74 (dating
corn surplus to use of self-propelled combine beginning with World War II).
207. Bill Ganzel, Beef, Feedlots & IBP, WESSELS LIVING HISTORY FARM (2017)
https://livinghistoryfarm.org/farminginthe50s/crops_08.html (showing that in 1945, just
under fifty percent of cultivation still was performed by horses and mules).
208. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 398–99 (explaining that the fourth round of Creative
Destruction led to a decentralized system of smaller farms and feedlots linked to regional
slaughterhouses and markets by truckers, and there was no longer a need to move cattle
across open ranges to transport them via railroads); Michael Billiel, Note, Fine-Tuning
Deregulation: The Interstate Commerce Commission’s Use of Its General Rail-
Exemption Power, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 827, 830 (1985) (finding that in the twentieth
century, trucks and barges started carrying more of the railroad cargo).
209. Perritt, supra note 3, at 423–25; see Billiel, supra note 208, at 830 (explaining
that as railroads became financially unstable, Congress was pushed into eliminating
outdated regulation).
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not until the Interstate Highway System beginning in the mid-1950s, did
roadways and high-capacity semi-trailer trucks gain a decisive advantage
over less flexible railroads.210
Freezing technologies relevant to beef, including flash freezing and
cryogenic packaging, were not invented until the mid-1930s, and it took a
generation for them to become influential in industry organization.211
Freezing certain types of food, especially fish, however, had been practiced
and received consumer acceptance long before that, beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century or before.212
IV. TWENTIETH CENTURY INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
After the end of the long cattle drives, beef production evolved into an
industry more fragmented than in 1890.213 The functions of the huge open
range rancher have been subdivided between decentralized cow-calf
operators and cattle feedlots, while the concentration of the packers has
remained high and increased somewhat.214
The cattle rancher’s consistent goal since long before the Civil War was
to decrease the distance that live cattle had to be moved from where they
were bred to where they were slaughtered.215 This was not much of a
210. Highway Existence, supra note 135.
211. See The History of NFRA, NATIONAL FROZEN & REFRIGERATED FOODS
ASSOCIATION, INC., https://nfraweb.org/about-nfra/history/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2019)
(noting consumer resistances to frozen foods in the 1940s and 1950s); see also Perritt,
supra note 3, at 371 (analyzing the determinants of the first two waves of Creative
Destruction in the beef industry); CONCENTRATION IN THE RED MEAT PACKING
INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at 71–72 (summarizing how operating costs were reduced in
the late 1950s because of the advanced highway system and new refrigeration, slaughter,
and shipping technologies).
212. The Strange History of Frozen Foods, EATER (Aug. 21, 2014, 9:40 AM),
https://www.eater.com/2014/8/21/6214423/the-strange-history-of-frozen-food-from-
clarence-birdseye-to-the (describing the history of frozen foods).
213. See James S. Drouillard, Current Situation and Future Trends for Beef
Production in the United States of America — A Review, 31 ASIAN-AUSTRALASIAN J.
ANIM. SCI. 1007 (June 21, 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC6039332/.
214. Id.
215. Imagine a network comprising a set of nodes connected by directed links. Each
node represents a stage in the trip a pound of beef makes from birth of a calf to the dinner
table. In a simplified higher-level network, each node represents a sub-network
comprising its own nodes and links. For example, the “feedlot” node in the macro-
network represents hundreds of separate feedlots and the representing transport of beef
between each node and its predecessor and successor. The cost variable is the arithmetic
result of the cost per unit of beef afforded by transportation technology, the distance, and
the quantity of beef moving through it.
Any one of the nodes can be the starting point for quantifying the variables representing
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problem when beef markets were local, before Swift and Armour’s
innovations.216 But a combination of scale economies and adverse political
reactions to environmental effects of cattle-raising encouraged the
movement of slaughterhouses and packinghouses to more remote locations
and centralizing them. That led to the location of large-scale slaughterhouses
and packinghouses in Chicago, while the refrigerator car enabled the
slaughtered cattle to reach Eastern markets in tolerable condition.217
Supplying the Chicago beef processing operations led to the cattle drive,
which lasted only so long as most of the herds were in Texas, and public land
was available for the herds to cross on their way to railheads in Kansas,
Nebraska, and Wyoming.218
This industry organization still required long-distance transport of live
beef in cattle cars, and the meatpackers now had enough capital to reorganize
the industry further so industry innovators began to push to decentralize the
slaughterhouse and packing operations so they could be located closer to
where the herds ended up after the drive.219 Meanwhile, the diminished
availability and increased cost of land encouraged cattle ranchers to migrate
north from Texas to Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Montana.220 The
combination of ranch relocation and decentralization of slaughterhouses and
values in the network. It is possible and useful to start with the dinner-table load and
make each unit of consumption one pound of cooked beef. Then, the weight for each
“upstream” node can be estimated by applying a factor representing waste. For example,
in shipping live beef, that factor would include cattle that die en route or become injured
so that they are not edible. (See discussion infra Part V.D.) A factor of two percent is
reasonable for spoilage between the packinghouse and delivery to the retail customer.
So, the factor for the weight carried by the last link would be 1.01. The factor established
for the transport of live animals for slaughter has been well-established for a long time.
Only about forty percent of the animals going to the slaughterhouse emerge from the
slaughterhouse. Another ten percent or so do not survive the trip. So, the weight factor
for any link involving the transport of live animals is 2.6 (1÷.4, plus.10).
216. Perritt, supra note 3, at 373; see Barbara Krasner-Khait, The Impact of
Refrigeration, HISTORY MAGAZINE (Feb. 2019), https://www.history-magazine.com/
refrig.html (discussing how essential refrigeration was to the expansion of the meat
industry).
217. Perritt, supra note 3, at 388; Krasner-Khait, supra note 216.
218. Perritt, supra note 3, at 397; see Wayne Gard, The Role of the Cattle Trails, 29
NEB. HISTORY 287, 299 (1958), https://history.nebraska.gov/sites/history.nebraska.gov/
files/doc/publications/NH1958CattleTrails.pdf; see also Katie Wagner, Tragedy of the
Commons in the American West: The Cattle Boom, ARCGIS, https://www.arcgis.com/
apps/MapJournal/index.html?appid=4c90d2adcc9542f2bbc1561a42871d86 (last visited
Dec. 28, 2019).
219. See Al Reinert, The End of the Trail, TEXAS MONTHLY (Nov. 1978),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/the-end-of-the-trail/ (“The newly simplified
scheme of refrigeration promised to eliminate the cost and hazard of transporting beef
on the hoof, but first the meatpacking plants had to move closer to the hooves.”).
220. Perritt, supra note 3, at 392; seeWagner, supra note 218.
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packing decreased two of the legs over which live cattle had to be moved —
one of them the length of the drive where cattle removed on the hoof, and
the second, the length of the train ride from railhead to processing facility.
At the same time, a feverish pace of railroad construction continuing after
the Civil War, increased the number of railheads and their geographic
dispersion, making it easier for large-scale ranches to be located near the
railheads.
The same shortages of public land and increasing land prices for private
land that made long cattle drives uneconomic also made large-scale ranching
less economic.221 By 1890, entrepreneurs realized that they should be
organizing cattle breeding and feeding on smaller plots of land with greater
density of cattle per acre.222 This was possible only with a food source other
than prairie grass. Exploding agricultural productivity provided the answer
in the form of corn surpluses. So now the optimal organization of beef
production was to locate cattle breeding and feeding near processing
facilities and also near corn growing territory and to ship the refrigerated
product to distant markets. Transportation costs both for the live animals
and their feed were thereby minimized. When these forces reached
equilibrium, the inflexibility of the railroad infrastructure represented the
main constraint on the further evolution of market structure.
The structure of the beef industry fluctuated considerably through the
twentieth century, though it has remained highly segmented.223 Some
segments became less concentrated, while others became more
concentrated.224 The links between adjacent segments likewise have varied
in their degree of concentration.225 Ranching — the initial stage of cattle
production — became less concentrated.226 At the beginning of the century,
221. Id. See generally Tom R. Troxel & Kenny Simon, Best Management Practices
for Small Beef Cow-Calf Herds, UNIV. OF ARK. DIV. OF AGRIC., https://www.uaex.
edu/publications/PDF/FSA-3117.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2019).
222. Id. at 398; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1950 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE (pt. 6), 5 U.S.
DEPT. OFCOMM. 69, 86 (1952) (explaining that at the beginning of the twentieth century,
two-thirds of acreage in the United States were dedicated to the production and feed of
livestock and poultry).
223. See Drouillard, supra note 213, at 1009 (providing a comprehensive overview of
the structure of the beef industry; U.S. system of beef production is highly segmented,
contrasting with highly integrated systems for pork and poultry production); see also In
re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 542 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (N.D. Tex. 1982)
(providing a diagram of the product flow in the industry).
224. Drouillard, supra note 213, at 1009.
225. Id.
226. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 392; Bill Bullard, Under Siege: The U.S. Live Cattle
Industry, 58 S.D. L. REV. 560, 570 (2013) (reasoning that cattle’s longer biological cycle
makes the early stages of cattle production less adaptable to poultry, dairy, and hog’s
highly concentrated production model).
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smaller enclosed cow-calf operations began to replace large open range
ranchers.227 By the end of the century, the segment was dominated by
thousands of relatively small cow-calf operations raising a few hundred cows
as a complement to other agricultural production.228 Acquiring rights to use
land in the quantities necessary for nineteenth-century style open-range
ranching had become impracticable.229
As the nodes in the cattle network, where cattle are initially produced,
became more geographically diffuse, so did the transportation infrastructure
necessary to link these nodes to the nodes in the adjacent segment: cattle
feedlots.230 Indeed, the cause-and-effect relationship ran both ways:
decentralization of cattle production would not have been possible without
the more flexible transportation infrastructure provided by trucks operating
on the expanded public highway system.231
Feedlots, the next stage in the production chain, where cattle are fattened
or “finished” for slaughterhouses, initially were relatively diffuse
geographically and decentralized.232 Surplus corn enabled farmers to feed
cattle in enclosures rather than relying on the ranchers to feed them on the
grass on larger areas of range before they were shipped to the
slaughterhouse.233 Through the century, however, environmental concerns
and some economies of scale encouraged the degree of concentration in the
feedlot industry.234
227. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 398. See generally Scott Michael Rank, American
West — The Cattle Industry, HIST. ONNET, https://www.historyonthenet.com/american-
west-the-cattle-industry (2019) (explaining that the invention of barbed wire and wind
pumps contributed to the enclosure of cattle in the late nineteenth century).
228. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 394; see also Bullard, supra note 226, at 570 (noting
that cattle and the cow-calf industry are the “meatpackers’ last frontier”).
229. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 392. See generally Ann Brower et al., The Cowboy,
the Southern Man, and the Man from Snowy River: The Symbolic Politics of Property
in Australia, the United States, and New Zealand, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 455,
491–92 (2009) (explaining the changes in land rights and ownership were largely
attributed to changing social and societal values along with the need for conservation and
subdivision development).
230. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 398; William E. Rosales, Dethroning Economic
Kings: The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 and Its Modern Awakening, 2004 WIS.
L. REV. 1497, 1525 (2004) (discussing cattle being raised on feedlots).
231. See HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 151.
232. See SIC 0211: Beef Cattle Feedlots, REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, https://www.
referenceforbusiness.com/industries/Agriculture-Forestry-Fishing/Beef-Cattle-
Feedlots.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2019).
233. See William D. McBride & Kenneth Mathews, Jr., The Diverse Structure and
Organization of U.S. Beef Cow-Calf Farms, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 8 (Mar. 2011),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/44530/7611_eib73.pdf?v=0 (last
visited Dec. 28, 2019).
234. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 388–89; Trout, supra note 57, at 529 (highlighting
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Concentration increased when beef packers established their own feedlots,
organized cattle auctions between cow-calf operators and feedlots, and
supplemented or replaced auctions between the feedlot stage in the cattle
slaughtering stage.
Beef slaughtering and packing operations substantially decentralized in
the first part of the twentieth century, as beef packers in the Chicago
stockyards moved their operations closer to the locations where beef was
being grown.235 This diffusion was animated in part by entrepreneurial
efforts to reduce the cost of transporting beef on the hoof, facilitated by the
changes in the transportation infrastructure from rail to truck, and
encouraged by the results of the Roosevelt Administration’s antitrust action
against the big four beef packers.236
As the century progressed, however, economies of scale and the growing
power of retail brands encouraged concentration. The physical facilities in
which slaughtering and packing operations took place remained relatively
dispersed geographically but their ownership became more concentrated.
The transportation links between feedlot and slaughterhouses became
much less concentrated, as the owner-operator a cattle transporter replaced
the railroad. This became so by the midpoint of the century and continues
to the present. Even vertically integrated processors like Cargill contract
with owner-operator truckers to transport beef between nodes in their
internal processing network. 237
Although an in-depth analysis of the retail food sector is beyond the scope
of this Article, the development of that sector inevitably affects the upstream
industry structure. Large supermarket chains exercise considerable market
power over their suppliers. This can favor popular brands of beef, which in
turn favors concentrated beef packers.
The rise of e-commerce, even before Amazon got into the retail grocery
business, facilitated direct packer to consumer sales of branded frozen boxed
beef.238 The boxed beef revolution not only enables eliminating separate
retailers altogether, but it also makes it likely that existing retailers will
eliminate their butcher operations, presenting to their consumers boxed beef
the use of feedlots in raising cattle).
235. See id.; YANKEE OF THEYARDS, supra note 27, at 26–27.
236. See HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 136, 161.
237. See generally Owner Operators, CARGILL, https://www.cargill.com/trans
portation/cmls-owner-operators (last visited Dec. 28, 2019) (noting that owner-operators
earn top rates and year-round freights with Cargill).
238. See IBP and Boxed Beef & a New “Big Four”, WESSELLSLIVINGHISTORYFARM
(2007), https://livinghistoryfarm.org/farminginthe50s/making-money/ibp-boxed-beef/
(last visited Dec. 28, 2019). See generally HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 151–62
(describing the boxed beef revolution in the industry).
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that they have purchased directly from the packers.
A. Cow-Calf Operations
Cow-calf operations are ranches that represent the first step in beef
production.239 They maintain cows and their calves after they are born,
usually on land not suitable or needed for crop production.240 On good grass,
each animal requires about thirty acres for an entire season. Cow-calf
operators’ principal product is “feeder calves,” which they sell to feedlots
for finishing.241
Sixty percent of cow-calf operators sell the calves at or shortly after
weaning, at between six and nine months of age, weighing 400-700
pounds.242 Most of these are small farms located in the southeast and
Southern Plains.243 About a third of the operations, usually larger ones,
continue grazing the calves for thirty to ninety days before selling them. This
is called “backgrounding.”244 These operations tend to be in the Northern
Plains and the West.245
Cow-calf operators specialize in managing herds of heifers and cows,
overseeing the birth of their calves and raising the calves to the point of
239. SeeDrouillard, supra note 213, at 1010–11 (noting that the vast majority of cow-
calf output is channeled to large commercial feedlots, although the cow-calf operator
sometimes retains title to their cattle while they go through the feedlot).
240. See id. at 1010.
241. See Alane Michaelson, How to Raise a Feeder Calf, CAREERTREND (last
modified July 5, 2017), https://careertrend.com/how-8600621-raise-feeder-calf.html.
242. SeeMcBride & Mathews, Jr., supra note 233, at iii, 5.
243. See id. at 8; see also Livestock Management, TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE,
https://tpwd.texas.gov/landwater/land/habitats/post_oak/habitat_management/cow/ (last
visited Dec. 28, 2019) (“As a general rule, moderate to light stocking rates for well-
managed pastures in this area are: one animal unit (cow with calf) per 8 – 15 acres on
native grass; 3 – 6 acres on tame pastures (bermudagrass/bahia grass); 50 – 75 acres on
wooded areas.”).
244. See McBride & Mathews, Jr., supra note 233, at iii, 5 (explaining that
backgrounding after weaning eliminates the stress of transportation and provides an
opportunity to acclimate calves to eat from a feed bunk, which is a long tray intended to
contain feed from which cattle eat directly); see also Keys to Success in Stocker
Programs, UNIVERSITY OF ARK. EXTENSION SERV., https://www.uaex.edu/
publications/pdf/mp184/Chapter9.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2019) (“Stocker (growing
calves on pasture) or backgrounding (growing calves using mixed feeds or stored
forages) programs add value to cattle for feedlots because they desire cattle that are
weaned, are from a minimum of suppliers, are familiar with feed bunks and water sources
and have minimal health issues . . . . Short- term (35- to 45 -day) preconditioning
programs add value to calves because these programs provide evidence the calves being
marketed (1) are weaned, (2) have been processed (dehorned, castrated, dewormed and
vaccinated) and (3) are familiar with feed sources.”).
245. SeeMcBride & Mathews, Jr., supra note 233, at 35.
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weaning, at which time they are sold to feedlots.246
Margins for cow-calf operators are slim when fully allocated costs are
taken into account. Many operators stay in business only because they do
not account for sunk capital costs in land or herds, or because raising beef is
only one of several lines of business, permitting them to share the cost of
capital in land and equipment among several different activities. For
example, a tractor might be used to distribute feed to cattle herds, and also
used to power implements for raising corn or soybeans.
The smaller operations in the South benefit from a longer grazing season
and less need for supplemental forage.247 This feeding schedule results in
lower feed costs and permits smaller operations to be sustainable. The larger
operations in the Northern Plains experience higher feed costs but can
compete with those in the South because of production efficiencies and
economies of scale.248
Branding and roundups are not important, because the cattle are contained
on land belonging to a single rancher. Only eighty percent of cow-calf
operators use branding or ear tagging.249
Despite the economies of scale, expansion is inhibited because of the
significant land area required for large-scale cow-calf production. “In most
areas of the United States, beef cow calf production is the residual user of
land. As the opportunity cost of pasture and rangeland increases for uses such
as crop production and recreational activities, the size of beef cow calf
operations may be limited or fragmented into smaller units.”250
The fragmentation of cow-calf operations enabled by independent
trucking was reflected by a dramatic increase in the number of possible
points of sale, manifested by “the rise of hundreds of country buying stations
and local auction markets.”251
Radio broadcasting also paid an important role. Its early morning
livestock market report enabled cattle farmers to seek out the market in
which they could get the best price.252
Although there was some concentration, beef sellers and beef packers
were highly fragmented. From 1992 to 1993, 88.8 percent of cow-calf
246. See Drouillard, supra note 213, at 1009.
247. SeeMcBride & Mathews, Jr., supra note 233, at iii.
248. See id.; see also UNIVERSITY OF ARK. EXTENSION SERV., supra note 244, at 58
(noting that pastured cattle ultimately headed for feedlots can be fed with hay and other
stored forages, are fed mixed diets comprised of fiber, corn, and other grains, or on grass).
249. McBride & Mathews , supra note 233, at iv.
250. Id. at iii.
251. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 67.
252. Id.
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operators sold fewer than 1,000 cattle, but the 152 sellers who sold at least
32,000 cattle annually accounted for forty-three percent of total sales.253
While the number of cow-calf operations decreased fifteen percent between
1997 and 2007 and the size increased thirteen percent from thirty-eight to
forty-three cattle, these changes were much less dramatic than in hog and
dairy farms, where capital was substituted for land by moving large scale
production into confinement facilities.254
The level of production is sensitive to price and the costs of feed, land,
machines, calving percentages, weather, calf death loss, and length of the
breeding season. The length of gestation and maturation for cattle imposes
a lag in responses to changes in price and costs of the factors of production.255
B. Feedlots
Two characteristics define feedlots: a confined enclosure; and where
cattle are fed grain-based diet rather than grass.256 The demise of open range
ranching after 1885 accelerated the shift to enclosed pasturage, and corn
surpluses resulting from improved agricultural productivity by the 1890s
were encouraging the use of grain in the enclosures.257 Thus, feedlots were
beginning to be an important part of cattle production by the turn of the
twentieth century.258 The Chicago Stockyards were a prime example.
Enclosed pens held tens of thousands of cattle, who were fed grain while
they were waiting for their turns at the slaughterhouse.259
Grass from public lands became insufficient to feed cattle herds for three
reasons. First, homesteaders and lessees enclosing public lands left fewer
grasslands available.260 Second, overgrazing meant that the number of feet
253. CONCENTRATION IN THEREDMEAT PACKING INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at 31. See
generally Ganzel, supra note 207 (discussing the historical events that caused ranching
to move away from consolidation by the midpoint of the twentieth century).
254. McBride & Mathews, Jr., supra note 233, at 1.
255. Id. at 1–2; see Lyle Holmgren & Dillon Feuz, 2015 Costs and Returns for a 200
Cow, Cow-Calf Operation, Northern Utah, UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY (Mar. 2015),
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1716&context=extension_
curall (calculating costs and revenue for cow-calf operation and providing a sample
budget to calculate varying production costs for cow-calf operations).
256. Ryan Goodman, Ask a Farmer: What is a Cattle Feedlot?, BEEF RUNNER (Oct.
8, 2012), https://beefrunner.com/2012/10/08/ask-a-farmer-what-is-a-cattle-feedlot.
257. See Hubbs, supra note 80, at 16–17, 21–22.
258. Id. at 7–8.
259. Monica Eng, Beef Backers Steak Out Their Claim, CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 11,
2009), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2009-11-11-0911090227-story.
html.
260. Ranching, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/
encyclopedia/ranching/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2019).
2020 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY COWBOY 181
available per acre diminished sharply.261 Third, the herds increased
substantially, even as the available public lands were shrinking.262
Once herds had to be provided with feed, hay, or corn, it was inefficient
to feed them in large spaces.263 Transporting feed over longer distances costs
more than transporting it over shorter distances. So, it began to make sense
to concentrate the herds and to feed them where they were concentrated.
Thus, the feedlot arose.264
Feedlots, as they were understood in 1890, were quite different from
feedlots as they are understood in 2020.265 In 1890 a feedlot — which
probably was not called by that name — often comprised several acres; it
was kind of a corral where the herd could be fed conveniently without having
to be rounded up from open grasslands.266
By the end of the twentieth century, “feedlot” was a term of art.267
Typically, it involved herds of cattle much more concentrated, with a higher
density of animals per square foot than had been the case a century before.268
Additionally, the food was mixed more scientifically to achieve nutritional
goals and the supply of food often was mechanized.269
261. Clara M. Love, History of the Cattle Industry in the Southwest, 19 SOUTHWEST
HISTORICALQUARTERLY 370, 390 (1916).
262. See id. at 376 (discussing the shrinking supply of public lands available after the
spread of homesteaders and railroads across the Midwest). See generally Hubbs, supra
note 80 (discussing the growth of cattle industry across the Midwest around the turn of
the twentieth century).
263. Al Reinert, The End of the Trail, TEX. MONTHLY (Nov. 1, 1978),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/the-end-of-the-trail/ (“There is an axiom in the
cattle business that it’s always cheaper in the long run — since cattle are such awesome
gluttons — to take them to their feed, instead of the reverse. Thus, Panhandle feedlots
came into being when Americans began to want the kind of well-marbled, juicy, and
tender meat that only a super-rich diet can develop, even on an animal as lazy as a cow.
As the demand increased, the feedlot owners proved willing and able to outspend the
packers for the prime young steers they intended to feed.”).
264. Hubbs, supra note 80, at 45–46 (explaining that Gustavus Swift pioneered the
cattle feedlot to facilitate decentralized slaughtering and packing of beef by developing
feedlots as an intermediate feeding step between a year on pasture and slaughter).
265. See id. at 50–61 (highlighting differences between feedlots of the 1890s and
those of the twenty-first century). See generally REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, supra note
232 (describing the history of feedlots, including details of technology changes in 1980s
and 1990s).
266. Hubbs, supra note 80, at 45–46.
267. See Goodman, supra note 256 (defining and describing feedlots).
268. See REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, supra note 232 (describing the concentration of
feedlot industry after 1970, which formerly had been dominated by relatively small
farmers).
269. See CONCENTRATION IN THE REDMEAT PACKING INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at 43
(“Feedlot cattle typically reach their slaughter weight in 3-6 months. After that there is
a market window of 3–4 for delivery for slaughter.”).
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Feedlots buy “feeder calves” from cow-calf operators at 400–800 pounds,
and sell “slaughter cows” to beef packers, at a slaughter weight of 1,000-
1,500 pounds.270 Cow-calf operators retain title to cattle on feed in feedlots
in some cases, but feedlot operators assume title partially or wholly in other
cases.271 Feedlots in the modern sense did not become prevalent until after
World War II.272 The USDA says that only 5.1 percent of U.S. cattle were
fed on feedlots in 1935, but that sixty-six percent were finished on feedlots
in 1963.273
Concentration is low in the feedlot segment of the industry.274 The big
feedlots were located near highly automated slaughter and packinghouses,
and the large processors began to move their facilities close to the feedlots,
relying more on non-union labor.275 A 1996 USDA study276 concluded that
packers obtain sixty-four percent of their cattle within seventy-five miles of
their plants, eighty-two percent within 150 miles, and ninety-five percent
within 270 miles.277
The limitations on the growth of feedlot size arose not from technologies
of confinement, herding, or feeding but from limitations of veterinary
medicine, which gradually improved, permitting economies of scale to be
realized more fully.278 Public policy also played a role, as some states
adopted tax and environmental policies favoring feedlots, but others sought
to discourage them. The result was a considerable shift westward.279
As the ethanol industry has risen, distilled grain from ethanol refineries
has become an important feedlot input, pulling feedlots closer to the
270. See USDA Terms and Definitions, BEEF2LIVE (Sept. 18, 2019),
https://beef2live.com/story-usda-cattle-terms-definitions-85-143143 (defining feeders
as “young steers or heifers, weighing approximately 400-800 pounds”); Brian McMurry,
Cow Size is Growing, BEEF (Feb 1, 2009), https://www.beefmagazine.com/genetics/
0201-increased-beef-cows (stating that the average size of a full-grown cow is now
estimated to be around 1,350 pounds).
271. REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, supra note 232.
272. Ganzel, supra note 207.
273. Id.
274. See Drouillard, supra note 213, at 1012 (reporting sixty-one percent of 26,586
feedlots in the U.S. “have fewer than 100 cattle,” and seventy-seven percent of cattle are
produced by feedlots having a “capacity greater than 1,000 animals”).
275. See Ganzel, supra note 207.
276. CONCENTRATION IN THEREDMEAT PACKING INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at 5.
277. See id. at 5, 21–22 (providing additional statistics).
278. See Hubbs, supra note 80, at 56–61 (identifying diseases and conditions that
veterinary medicine had to address for large-scale feedlots to be successful).
279. REFERENCE FORBUSINESS, supra note 232 (describing geographic shift of feedlot
industry from Midwest to southern plains states: Texas, Nebraska, Kansas, and
Colorado).
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refineries, and generally concentrating more of the feedlot industry in the
Midwest. In 1996, large packing plants obtained nearly half their cattle from
large feedlots, while smaller plants obtained less than a quarter from large
feedlots.280
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the role of public markets such
as auctions and terminals declined in favor of packer purchases directly from
producers and captive supplies as a result of vertical integration and vertical
coordination agreements.281 Packers primarily purchase cattle on the spot
market rather than through futures or forward markets or marketing
agreements.282
C. Beef Processing
Beef slaughtering and packing operations283 centralized, mainly in
Chicago, during the nineteenth century. One of the most dramatic
phenomena of the twentieth century was the decentralization of beef packing
to facilities located closer to cattle feedlots.284 Ownership, however,
remained centralized.285 Cudahy was the first of the big four packers to
recognize that:
[T]here were economies to be had if they moved away from the urban
stockyards closer to the source of their raw materials. They realized it was
cheaper to locate a packinghouse close to the new large feedlots, buy cattle
directly and ship the meat in quarters of beef rather than paying for
shipping the live animals to an urban market. Cudahy was the first packer
to move away from Chicago.286
Live cattle are transported to the processing facility as quickly as possible,
spending only minutes in a truck trailer, rather than hours or days in a railroad
280. See CONCENTRATION IN THE REDMEAT PACKING INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at 6;
In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 542 F. Supp. 1122, 1131–40 (N.D. Tex. 1982)
(describing how pricing works in the competitive market for slaughter beef).
281. See CONCENTRATION IN THEREDMEAT PACKING INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at 12.
282. See id. at 6, 31–32, 42. (“Packers may contract for future delivery of livestock
through an exclusive marketing agreement with individual feedlots, in which price is
based on market prices at the time of slaughter. Packers may also purchase cattle through
forward contracts in which price is specified in advance or is based on futures prices or
some other formula.”).
283. To facilitate less cumbersome discussion, the text conflates these conceptually
distinct functions into “beef packing.”
284. See Joshua Spect, The Price of Plenty: How Beef Changed America, THE
GUARDIAN (May 7, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/07/
the-price-of-plenty-how-beef-changed-america (“Decentralising slaughter would make
wholesale butchering again dependent on local knowledge that the packers could not
acquire from Chicago.”).
285. Ganzel, supra note 207.
286. Id. (reporting decentralization by Cudahy).
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stock car.287 After slaughtering, the sides of beef spend three weeks or more
in a refrigerated locker to “age.”288 The sides of beef are then subdivided
into major muscle groups and conventional cuts before undergoing another
aging process for forty days.289 Each cut is individually packaged in a heavy
custom-formed “cryo-vac” packaging and then blast frozen in a vacuum.290
The frozen cuts are kept in a negative forty-five degrees Fahrenheit cold-
storage locker that maintains humidity. Shipments occur directly from the
locker.291
Flash freezing involves exposing beef to temperatures well below the
freezing point of water, typically at negative forty degrees Fahrenheit.292
Flash freezing results in smaller ice crystals, which do less damage to the
beef molecules than larger crystals.293 When slow-frozen beef thaws, the
damaged tissue leaks into the interstices left by the ice crystals, resulting in
a mushy consistency and taste.294 This does not happen with flash-frozen
food. The technique was developed by Clarence Birdseye in the early
twentieth century,295 popularized in “TV Dinners” beginning in 1954,296 and
refined by Daniel Tippmann, who used a vacuum and passed supercooled air
through pallets of cut beef.297 Consumer acceptance of frozen beef lagged,
however, until the late 1950s and 1960s.298
287. See Steve Johnson, Flavor in a Flash! – Fresh Frozen vs. Frozen Foods, NEB.
STAR BEEF (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.nebraskastarbeef.com/kind-frozen-fresh-
frozen-vs-frozen-foods/ (noting Nebraska Star Beef’s processing facility is located near
their cattle feedlots).
288. Id. (discussing harvested carcasses spend “at least twenty-one days in a locker”




292. Id. (describing the flash-freezing process, which freezes meat nearly
instantaneously).
293. Martha Zepp, Understanding the Process of Freezing, PENN STATE EXTENSION
(last modified May 3, 2018), https://extension.psu.edu/understanding-the-process-of-
freezing (explaining “large ice crystals punch through cell membranes,” which results in
a loss of liquid when thawing).
294. See Johnson, supra note 287 (noting food frozen over a longer period of time
does not maintain its freshness).
295. See U.S. Patent No. 1,773,079 (filed June 18, 1927); U.S. Patent No. 1,773,080
(filed June 20, 1927); U.S. Patent No. 1,773,081 (filed June 18, 1927).
296. The Strange History of Frozen Foods, EATER (Aug. 21, 2014, 9:40 AM),
https://www.eater.com/2014/8/21/6214423/the-strange-history-of-frozen-food-from-
clarence-birdseye-to-the (describing the history of frozen foods, after Birdseye’s
invention).
297. U.S. Patent No. 12/879,521 (filed May 12, 2011).
298. The History of NFRA, NATIONAL FROZEN&REFRIGERATED FOODSASS’N, INC.,
https://nfraweb.org/about-nfra/history/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2019) (noting consumer
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The boxed beef phenomenon began in 1960 with the Iowa Beef Packers.299
Iowa Beef “built a completely new plant in Dennison, Iowa, close to big
feedlots and cheap energy sources. The sprawling plant was all on one floor
so that the beef carcasses could be moved around on conveyers. Immediately
after the animal was killed, the beef was refrigerated and the rest of the
process was done in the cold. That reduced the shrinkage of the meat from
dehydration.”300
“It was a natural progression from the efficiencies of shipping carcasses
to shipping boxed beef. There is a lot of wasted space in a modern truck or
rail car filled with chilled sides of beef. A side of beef has an awkward shape
— it can’t be neatly packed, and a side has a lot of bone and trim that will
never go into the meat case. It was logical to move to boxed beef.”301
In 1992, the four largest packers accounted for eighty-two percent of beef
slaughter, up from thirty-six percent in 1980.302 A 1996 USDA survey of
fifteen slaughter and packing plants showed an average slaughter rate of 216
head per hour for slaughter-only plants and 273 head per hour for slaughter
and fabrication plants.303 The same study showed significant diseconomies
of scale in packing operations.304
Packers make cattle purchase decisions daily. Part of daily cattle purchase
choices is the balance among cattle purchased in the spot, cash market, cattle
purchases committed to under marketing agreements, and cattle committed
to in futures or forward contracts.305
D. Labor Markets
The labor markets for cowboys as herders have changed dramatically over
the century; the labor markets for slaughterhouse and packinghouse workers
have remained the same. The functions performed by the nineteenth-century
cowboy now are performed by three different occupations: cowboys and
resistances to frozen foods in the 1940s and 1950s).
299. Ganzel, supra note 207 (reporting that shipping boxed beef directly to consumers
originated with Iowa Beef Packers in 1960).
300. Id.
301. See id. (quoting IBP executive Dale Tinstman); see also Drouillard, supra note
213, at 9 (reporting that most of the output of beef packing industry is distributed in the
form of boxed beef).
302. See CONCENTRATION IN THEREDMEAT PACKING INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at 13;
see also id. at 31 (stating that the big three firms — ConAgra, Excel, and IBP —
accounted for seventy-five percent of the market).
303. See id. at 53.
304. See id. at 55 (chain speeds, as a measure of output, decreased with increasing
plant size).
305. Id. at 44 (describing the elements of the decision).
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ranch hands, feedlot herdsmen, and cattle truck drivers.
The Indeed.com job board advertised for 108 “cattle farm” positions on
July 31, 2019306 and 745 for “cowboy.”307 By way of comparison, the same
job board had 157,589 ads for “truck driver” on the same date308 and 24,642
for “construction worker.”309 The job descriptions mostly required the
ability to perform general farm duties as well as those associated specifically
with cow-calf operations.310
A USDA sponsored study of cow-calf operation costs311 showed labor
inputs varying between two and four hours per bred cow for paid employees
and twelve to twenty-two hours per bred calf for unpaid labor
(proprietors).312 This is consistent with small-farm operations that employ
workers outside the family only sporadically.
Indeed.com had ninety-two “feedlot jobs.”313 For example, the ad for Bull
Creek in Le Mars, IA was indicative of similar ads: “New Progressive cattle
feedlot in Northwest Iowa between LeMars and Akron Iowa looking for Pen
Riders/walkers/feeding/processing. Must have experience and the
willingness to learn. Must be good with people and a good team player;
come join our team!”314 Compensation for feedlot workers was similar to
that for cow-calf operation employees, ranging from $25,000 to $50,000
annually.315
Feedlots employ substantial numbers of cattle herders, still known as
“cowboys.” They wear cowboy hats, cowboy boots, ride horses, and use
306. Cattle Farm Jobs, Employment, INDEED.COM (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.in
deed.com/q-Cattle-Farm-jobs.html.
307. Range Cowboy Cow Calf, INDEED.COM (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.in
deed.com/jobs?q=cowboy&l&vjk=3be0f9cd0730a8a8.
308. Truck Driver Jobs, INDEED.COM (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.indeed.com/
jobs?q=truck+driver&l=.
309. Construction Worker Jobs, INDEED.COM (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.indeed.
com/q-construction-worker-jobs.html.
310. Full Time Farm Hand, INDEED.COM (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.indeed.com/q-
Cattle-Farm-jobs.html?advn=2540334193340019&vjk=cad1d999826242b4 (last visited
July 31, 2019); Range Cowboy Cow Calf, INDEED.COM (Oct. 1, 2019), https://
www.indeed.com/jobs?q=cowboy&l&vjk=3be0f9cd0730a8a8.
311. Sara D. Short, Characteristics and Production Costs of U.S. Cow-Calf
Operations, U.S. DEP’T OF ARGIC. (Nov. 16, 2001), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/47150/16084_sb974-3_1_.pdf?v=0.
312. Id. at 7 (charting “labor efficiency” in Table 1).
313. Feedlot Jobs, INDEED.COM (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.indeed.com/jobs?
q=feedlot&l=.
314. Id.
315. See Farm Hand/Laborer, INDEED.COM (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.indeed.com/
jobs?q=feedlot&l&vjk=970fc5da99540581.
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their horses to herd the cattle.316 The average number of employees per
feedlot “increased from 10.36 in 2010 to 15.31 in 2015.”317 The number of
cattle per full-time employee increased from 1,000 in 2004 and 2010 to 1,095
in 2015.318 One quasi-credible report says that there were some 10,000
workers in the field of “support activities for animal production,” and that
the annual salary was only about $20,000 annually.319
Recruiting is limited by a lack of work ethic, attracting people to rural
areas, and attracting employees willing to work more than forty hours per
week.320 The early twentieth-century trucking labor force was comprised
mostly of farm boys and young men from country villages “willing to work
unconscionably long hours at low pay just to be working at all,” thereby
satisfying an increasing demand for farmers who wanted to ship more
cheaply by truck than by rail.321 Trucking offered a chance to remain in the
country while, at least theoretically, becoming the owners of small
businesses rather than factory hands deprived of their independence.”322
Many farmers also owned their own trucks and thus starting a trucking
operation to haul others’ freight did not require any capital outlay.323
Often, they priced below cost, because they were ignorant of concepts
such as depreciation and kept poor track of actual expenses.324 The result
was an intensification of the competitive pressure on railroads and unionized
truckers.325
In the twenty-first century, owner-operators are mostly truck-load carriers.
They have been in the trucking business for an average of twenty-six years,
316. SeeKansas Beef, Pen Riders – The Feedlot Cowboys, YOUTUBE (June 12, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yxaLh0KRn60 (explaining the role of feedlot
cowboys, responsible for 17,000 heads of feed in a floodlit); see also JBSUSA1, JBS
Five Rivers Careers, YOUTUBE (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=R3pfbbLC-9Y (attempting to recruit feedlot cowboys).
317. Jacob Birch & Kathleen Brooks, 2015 Nebraska Feedyard: Labor Cost
Benchmarks and Historical Trends, INST. OF AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES (2015),
extensionpublications.unl.edu/assets/html/ec836/build/ec836.htm.
318. Id.
319. Oswald J. Eppers, Modern Cowboy Jobs — More than Campfire Romantic,
STREET DIRECTORY, https://www.streetdirectory.com/travel_guide/189244/careers_
and_job_hunting/modern_cowboy_jobs__more_than_campfire_romantic.html.
320. Birch & Brooks, supra note 317, at 5. But see Perri Capell, Cowboy as a
Career?, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2005), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB11187067
3562958624 (reporting on an interview with a cowboy who disagrees with the
conventional wisdom that being a cowboy is one of the worst occupations).
321. HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 47.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 48.
324. Id. at 50.
325. Id. at 51.
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and were thirty-seven years old, on average when they became an owner-
operator.326 Their average age is fifty-five, eighty-six percent have a high
school diploma, and they earn on average $50,000 per year.327
The nineteenth-century cowboy transported cattle by driving them on the
hoof from the open range to railheads. The twentieth-century cowboy was
an independent owner-operator trucker who transported cattle from cow-calf
operations to feedlots and from feedlots to slaughterhouses. The ratio of the
cowboy to beef was much higher in the trucking context than in the long
cattle drive context. Roughly a dozen cowboys could handle a herd of a
couple of thousand cattle.328 Each semitrailer truck requires a driver and can
accommodate roughly twenty-five cattle, depending on their weight. But
trucks drive considerably faster than cattle can walk, and the distance over
which cattle are trucked is shorter than the distances of the long cattle
drives.329 The speed of transport is a product of technology. Decreased
distance is a product of the decentralization of the beef industry.
Word-of-mouth was an important recruiting and job search tool in 1875,
and it remains so today. A young man seeking work as a cowboy could go
to town, ask around, and pretty quickly find out who was hiring. A young
man or woman in 1990 could ask around wherever cattlemen gather — at
auctions and shows. Now, course, word-of-mouth occurs via email, Internet
websites,330 and social media.
326. Owner-Operator and Professional Employee Driver Facts, OOIDA FOUND.,
https://www.ooida.com/OOIDA%20Foundation/RecentResearch/OOfacts.asp (last
visited July 31, 2019) (showing the data presented in the text relates to all owner-
operators, but there is no reason to believe that the demographics for cattle truck drivers
differ).
327. Id.
328. Cowboys, HISTORY (Apr. 26, 2010), https://www.history.com/topics/westward-
expansion/cowboys.
329. A reasonable representation for labor productivity in transporting cattle is beef-
miles-per hour. A large cattle herd travels at a bit less than two miles per hour. If a herd
comprises 2,000 cattle, that is 4,000 beef-miles-per-hour divided by twelve cowboys,
showing that each cowboy produces 333.33 beef miles per hour. A cattle truck
transporting fifty beeves at forty-five miles per hour produces 2,250 beef miles per hour,
which represents the labor productivity of its driver. So, labor productivity for this
branch of cowboy has increased nearly tenfold in the last century and a half. See Philip
K. Thornton, Livestock Production: Recent Trends, Future Prospects, 365 PHIL.
TRANSACTION ROYAL SOC’Y B BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2853–67 (2010), https://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2935116/.
330. Drive For Us, STEVE’S LIVESTOCK TRANSPORT, http://www.slt.ca/drive-for-us/
(last visited Oct. 29, 2019) (“Steve’s Livestock Transport, North America’s largest
commercial livestock transportation company, has immediate opportunities for
motivated owner-operators and company drivers who want to advance their careers and
help keep the economy moving. If you are looking for purposeful work, love being on
the road and are eager to contribute to one of today’s most important industries as part
of a company that truly cares, join us!”); Livestock Trucking, INDEED.COM,
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Then, as now, site visits supplemented word-of-mouth. A cowboy looking
for work in 1875 would visit a series of ranches, inquiring at each whether
the ranch was hiring. He might also visit loading docks at railheads and see
if anyone was hiring cowboys to accompany the cattle in the stock cars on
their way to slaughter and packing houses. Today he can drive around to
different facilities looking for work, but he also can do virtual site visits. A
firm that is actively recruiting is likely to have a notice to that effect on its
website. In addition, job boards provide clearinghouses for independent
truckers.331 Any shipper or consignee desiring truck transportation can post
a notice on one of these boards, and any owner-operator can respond by
submitting a bid.
Labor union organization is nonexistent in all three labor markets, except
for a handful of cattle truck drivers who are classified as employees of
trucking companies hauling general freight and thus outside the agricultural
exemption.
V. LAW’S IMPEDIMENTS
The agricultural exemptions in the Interstate Commerce Act and the
National Labor Relations Act allowed the beef industry to develop relatively
free of governmental regulation.332 Market forces thus determined the
industry structure to a greater extent than was possible in other American
industries.333
Law can influence Creative Destruction in several ways. It can be one of
the causes, as when homesteading laws helped bring about the destruction of
the long cattle drive.334 It can seek to block the technologies that cause
Creative Destruction, as some people propose with respect to Artificial
https://www.indeed.com/q-Livestock-Trucking-jobs.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2019)
(listing 58 independent cattle trucking positions); Owner Operators, CARGILL,
https://www.cargill.com/transportation/cmls-owner-operators (last visited Oct. 29,
2019).
331. See Load Board, LIVESTOCK NETWORK, https://www.livestocknetwork.
com/Cattle_Loads/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2019); see also Livestock Haulers, LIVESTOCK
TRANSPORT, http://www.livestock-transport.com/hauler/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2019)
(“Search Haulers. They are here to get you on your way.”).
332. Kirsten Zerger, The NLRA Agricultural Exemption–A Functional or Mechanical
Approach?, 2 INDUS. RELATIONS L. J. 131, 137 (1977).
333. Savannah Kuper, The Politics Behind America’s Industrial Meat Industry,
CLIMATE CHANGE, FOOD, SOCIAL ISSUES (Apr. 2, 2014), https://edblogs.columbia.edu/
scppx3335-001-2014-1/2014/04/02/the-sham-of-meat-politics/.
334. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 409; Ray H. Mattison, The Hard Winter and the
Range Cattle Business,1 MONT. MAG. HIST. 5, 5, 21 (1951) (discussing changes in the
cattle industry).
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Intelligence and robotics.335 It can retard adaptation, as in the case of
economic regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act,336 some aspects of
collective bargaining, and some interpretations of competition law.337
In the nineteenth century, property law helped spawn and subsequently
extinguish the long cattle drive.338 Open range law combined with railroad
technology and refrigerator car technology gave rise to enormous ranches on
public lands in Texas from which cattle were driven on the hoof to railheads
in Kansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming.339 Within about fifteen years, however,
homesteading law combined with steel-plow, windmill, and barbed-wire-
fence technologies, brought the long cattle drives to an end.340 The high-
point of open-range ranching occurred in 1885.341 Thereafter, technology
development and other legal regimes shaped further waves of Creative
Destruction, and the industry structure that emerged as an adaptation to
them.342 During this period, however, the period from the last decade of the
nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century, the law was not so
much a driver of Creative Destruction or a facilitator of adaptation as it was
a potential impediment.343 The beef industry largely avoided these
impediments because of special exemptions for the agricultural sector,
including the beef industry.
The law played a significantly different role in the third and fourth waves
335. SeeMara Hvistendahl,CanWe Stop AI Outsmarting Humanity?, THEGUARDIAN
(Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/mar/28/can-we-stop-
robots-outsmarting-humanity-artificial-intelligence-singularity (highlighting perceived
dangers of AI as a threat to humanity and summarizing arguments for prohibiting “super
intelligent” AI).
336. See discussion infra Part 0.
337. See discussion infra Parts 0., 0.
338. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 408; Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of
Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 170–72 (1975)
(providing a history of the impact of western migration on land use and the development
of property law to control unwanted intrusions and expansions onto private property by
cattlemen and sheepherders).
339. Perritt, supra note 3, at 364–365; see Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, Cowboys
and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 489, 499 (2002) (noting the associations that
developed among cattlemen facilitated cattle drives, but this was then undone by a
change in property laws).
340. Perritt, supra note 3, at 392; Valerie Weeks Scott, The Range Cattle Industry:
Its Effect on Western Land Law 28 MONT. L. REV. 155 (1967) (identifying the
relationship between the Homestead Act of 1862 and other pressures that led to the
decline of large cattle drives).
341. Perritt, supra note 3, at 392 n.139; Mattison, supra note 334, at 5–7 (explaining
that 1885 was the apex of free-range cattle).
342. Perritt, supra note 3, at 365.
343. Perritt, supra note 3, at 403.
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of Creative Destruction than it played in the first and second.344 The first
wave was facilitated by public land law that permitted ranchers to cultivate
herds numbering thousands to hundreds of thousands of acres of land for
free.345 The same land law permitted long cattle drives without the need to
pay transit fees or to confront legal claims of trespass.346
In the second wave, the law closed off the long cattle drives by granting
exclusive rights in the hitherto public land for very low prices, drawing
hundreds of thousands of homesteaders to what had been rangeland.347 The
legal framework essentially abstained from addressing disputes between the
drovers and the homesteaders, requiring them to fall back on self-help
measures, including organized violence and numbers at polling places.
In the third and fourth waves, the law played a potential and pernicious
role, by distracting market participants from reality, in the case of antitrust
law, or by seeking to retard adjustment to new technologies, in the case of
economic regulation and labor law.348 The beef industry benefited from
exemptions from much of this influence.
A. Economic Regulation
The most important legal doctrine shaping the twentieth-century beef
industry was the agricultural exemption to truck regulation. The exemption
allowed independent owner-operator truckers to develop a flexible
transportation system to support the dispersed activities of cow-calf
operators and feedlots and to link them with more concentrated beef
packers.349 The agricultural exemption in the Interstate Commerce Act
344. See generally Perritt, supra note 3 (providing background information on the
four waves of Creative Destruction); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM
ANDDEMOCRACY (1942) (outlining the process of Creative Destruction).
345. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 401 (sharing that the federal government “allow[ed]
free grazing and traversing of the public lands, which comprised most of the plains
states”); see alsoKaren R. Merrill,Whose Home on the Range?, 27 W.HIST. Q. 433, 435
(1996) (highlighting that “ranchers were able to graze their animals for free,
and . . . build up enormous operations”).
346. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 401 (citingMerrill, supra note 345, at 433) (clarifying
that “Texas cattlemen could . . . enjoy free feed and free transport from their Texas
ranches to the railheads in Kansas and further north”). See generally Scott, supra note
340 (discussing open-range cattle industry in the western United States between 1864
and 1900).
347. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 401 (suggesting that the government’s “policy was
the encouragement of smaller-scale settled farming under the Homestead Act of 1862”);
Scott, supra note 340, at 177.
348. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 401–26 (providing background information on the
law’s role in the waves of Creative Destruction); see, e.g., Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and
the Origin of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2317–32 (2013).
349. SeeMotor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, §§ 203(b)(4a)–(4b), (6), 49
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allowed independent trucking to develop in a way that supported the
dispersion of cow-calf operations and feedlots, something that would have
happened to a much more modest extent, if it happened at all, under the
economic regulatory regime applied to the rest of the trucking industry and
railroads.350
The architects of economic regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act
explicitly intended to use it to block Creative Destruction in the beef
industry.351 The industry escaped the potential obstructionist effects of ICC
regulation by obtaining and protecting the agricultural exemption.
Trucking began at the local level.352 Merchants and manufacturers began
to substitute light trucks for animal-drawn wagons, and as their trucks had
excess capacity, they offered haulage to others. Truck transport was a local
phenomenon because the only adequate roads were local.
Availability of truck transportation and its price tended to fluctuate widely
depending on how much excess capacity truck owners had after they hauled
their own goods. Prices were low because the owner’s principal businesses
had already covered the capital costs of the trucks.
As the industry grew with improved roads, higher capacity trucks, and
growing dissatisfaction with railroad service, patterns of localization and
byproduct-pricing persisted. Scheduled, over the road, operations developed
later than local cartage. While shippers and consignees wanted stability in
the provision of over the road services, the less formal, ad hoc nature of
contract relationships continued in the local cartage part of the market.
Support for the regulation of trucking came from three sources.353 First, it
came from shippers and consignees who wanted to stabilize the market.
They were interested in reducing the incidence and frequency of entry and
exit. Second, established truckers wanted to protect their market share
against new entrants, particularly those who charged lower rates. Third, the
railroads were fighting to forestall competition from a new mode that was
Stat. 543; HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 58 (“[T]he exemption primarily served its intended
function: it helped individual farmers . . . haul . . . livestock to market more cheaply than
they could via railroad or regulated trucks.”).
350. See id.
351. Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 49-41, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); see Thomas
Gale Moore, Trucking Deregulation, LIBRARY OF ECON. & LIBERTY: CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON., https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/TruckingDeregulation.
html (last visited Oct. 29, 2019) (highlighting the negative consequences of the Interstate
Commerce Act that likely would have inhibited Creative Destruction in the beef industry
if trucking had not undergone deregulation after the Act’s passage).
352. Roberts, supra note 173, at 59 (citing C. H. Spencer, Business Getters for Small
Concerns, 108 SCI. AM. 76 (1913)) (conveying that local trucking came first, with
delivery radii of up to fifty miles, compared with ten miles for horse-drawn vehicles).
353. Moore, supra note 351.
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more efficient and therefore, if left to the market, could both charge lower
prices and provide better service — up to certain stage lengths.354
Regulation entered the picture because the railroads understood the
competitive economics analyzed in Section III.E. The Interstate Commerce
Act and the Interstate Commerce Commission established a legal regime
well-suited to discouraging trucking of beef.355 Both railroad companies,
who sought to eliminate “ruinous competition”, and the Granger movement,
which sought reduced rail transportation rates, initially favored the Interstate
Commerce Act. 356
Moreover, established truckers favored regulation as a barrier to new entry
and low-cost competition. After the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of
1935,357 both defenders of the status quo and opponents of innovation had a
powerful vehicle to advance their interests.358
The principal objectives of the regulatory regime were to set a floor under
rates, prohibiting rate cutting, and restricting entry of new operators.359 The
railroads, the Teamsters Union, and Teamster-organized trucking carriers
pushed for regulation that would limit the effects of competition, as part of
the New Deal.360 Secretary of Agriculture, Henry A. Wallace, however,
recognized that fragmented trucking featuring independent drivers could
help “undermine the monopoly power of railroad-based food processors,”
and he successfully spared agricultural trucking from the regulatory regime
applicable to trucking in general.361
Even as the Teamsters developed into a national behemoth, the
agricultural exemption — Section 203B of the Motor Carrier Act —
exempted truckers hauling farm products from the regulatory regime that
empowered the Teamsters.362
354. See generally Paul Steven Dempsey, Interstate Trucking: The Collision of
Textbook Theory and Empirical Reality, 20 TRANSP. L. J. 185 (1992) (providing a helpful
discussion of the adverse effects of deregulating the trucking industry).
355. Moore, supra note 351.
356. See id.
357. See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 310 U.S. 534, 538–41 (1940)
(summarizing the legislative history of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935).
358. See generally Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) (adjudicating the
preemption controversy over challenges to higher capacity automobile carriers).
359. See HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 53–54 (discussing the barriers to entry, and the
regulation of trucking rates).
360. See id. at 53 (explaining how the evolution of transportation regulation during
the New Deal created a “highway transportation market [that] was defined more by
government policy than by purely economic motives”).
361. Id. at 44.
362. See id. at 55–56 (discussing the growth of the Teamsters, and the “agricultural
exception” found in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935).
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Cattlemen in the 1930s “turned . . . to unregulated trucking as a tool for
challenging the Packers control over live cattle prices.”363 By the 1930s,
cattle producers who dominated the National Cattlemen’s Association were
not ranchers commanding huge expanses of land in theWest; they were Corn
Belt producers, who usually fed fewer than a couple of hundred cattle,
incidental to the farming operations. Their profitability depended upon
careful monitoring and tactics taking advantage of fluctuations in the prices
for beef and commodity prices. They had to be nimble.364 They were
instinctively strongly opposed to government intervention, even if it was
advertised as likely to stabilize their incomes.365 Independent trucking
offered them a way to seek profits without the burdens of governmental
bureaucracy.366
Spokesmen for the trucking industry argued that the economics of trucking
were ill-suited for regulation — making most of the same arguments that led
to the deregulation of the industry in the mid-1970s. They were right. Both
entry and exit in the trucking industry are easy. To enter the market, all an
entrepreneur needs to do is buy or lease a truck, find someone who wants to
ship something, and he is in business. If the occupation doesn’t pay or
otherwise doesn’t suit him, the trucker can sell the truck in a robust
secondary market and not be too much worse off when he undertakes a
different occupation.367 The result of these realities is a considerable amount
of churn in the identity of suppliers of trucking services. Prices tend to be
wildly unstable because some independent truckers are ignorant about
depreciation and amortization of capital costs, while others have a profitable
base of traffic and want to supplement it by filling up backhauls or otherwise
keeping the marginal cost close to zero.
The concept of economic regulation for trucking was born into the politics
of anti-competition. As regulation sank its teeth into the industry it worked,
as it was continuing to work with respect to rail transportation, as a powerful
antidote to innovation. An operator that wanted to offer new technologies
was opposed and eventually thwarted by those wanting to protect the status
quo. Those offering lower prices because they had adopted new technology
were thwarted as well. Not only the railroads used political levers of the ICC
363. Id. at 63.
364. See Drouillard, supra note 3, at 1008, 1010 (clarifying that market and weather
conditions have a major impact on “the age at which cattle are placed into feedlots”).
365. See HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 64 (examining the factors that contributed to
cattlemen’s opposition to “government regulations on livestock marketing”).
366. See id. at 65 (suggesting that cattlemen “found trucks to be more effective for
boosting incomes than government” regulations).
367. See Dempsey, supra note 354, at 193–94.
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against the truckers, but the truckers also used them against railroads.368 The
less efficient and less inventive producers in both industries used them to
protect against their more nimble and innovative competitors. The beef
industry escaped all this because of the agricultural exemption from
economic regulation.
East Texas Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express,369 arose when
three motor carriers filed a complaint against a competing carrier, alleging
that its competitor’s transportation of fresh and frozen meats in interstate
commerce without a certificate of convenience and necessity violated the
Interstate Commerce Act.370 The Commission agreed, holding that the
frozen items were not within the agricultural exemption.371 The district court
invalidated the Commission’s order, holding that the commodities were
within the exemption, and the Supreme Court agreed.372
The Court reasoned:
It is plain from this change that the exemption of ‘agricultural
commodities’ was considerably broadened by making clear that the
exemption was lost not by incidental or preliminary processing but by
manufacturing. Killing, dressing, and freezing a chicken is certainly
a change in the commodity. But it is no more drastic a change than the
change which takes place in milk from pasteurizing, homogenizing,
adding vitamin concentrates, standardizing, and bottling. Yet the
Commission agrees that milk so processed is not a ‘manufactured’
product, but falls within the meaning of the ‘agricultural’ exemption. 52
M.C.C. 511, 551. The Commission also agrees that ginned cotton and
cottonseed are exempt. Id., 523–524. But there is hardly less difference
between cotton in the field and cotton at the gin or in the bale or between
cottonseed in the field and cottonseed at the gin, than between a chicken
in the pen and one that is dressed. The ginned and baled cotton and the
cottonseed, as well as the dressed chicken, have gone through a processing
stage. But neither has been ‘manufactured’ in the normal sense of the
word.373
The Agricultural Exemption, presently codified at 49 U.S.C. § 13506,374
applies to the Surface Transportation Board, successor, in material part, to
368. Id. at 223–24.
369. 351 U.S. 49 (1956).
370. Id. at 49.
371. Id. (summarizing procedural history).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. See 49 U.S.C. § 13506(a)(6)(A) (exempting transportation of “ordinary
livestock” from regulation).
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the ICC.375
B. Collective Bargaining and Labor Market Rigidities
The agricultural exemption under the National Labor Relations Act and
its limitation to statutory employees, excluding independent contractors,
meant that cow-calf, feedlot operations, and the transportation services that
connected them could be shaped entirely by market forces and not
constrained by collectively bargained labor agreements.376 Beef packing, on
the other hand, is subject to federal labor law and was highly organized
through much of the twentieth century.
Trade unions exist to protect and enhance compensation and working
conditions on a foundation represented by the status quo.377 Therefore, union
organization and collective bargaining are hostile to the adjustments required
by Creative Destruction. Indeed, much effective organization by trade
unions was occasioned by real or perceived hardships associated with
adaptation to new technologies.
The beef industry has largely avoided these effects because of an
agricultural exemption in the National Labor Relations Act and because the
modern-day cowboy in the form of an owner-operator independent truck
driver is not an “employee” protected by the Act.378
Collective bargaining has an uneven presence in the beef industry.
Owner-operator independent truckers are not entitled to engage in collective
bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act.379 Cow-calf operation
and feedlot cowboys are outside the coverage of the National Labor
Relations Act because of the agricultural exemption.380 On the other hand,
the packers were highly organized at the beginning of the twentieth
century,381 and technologically driven concentration made it easier for
375. See Serv. First Logistics, Inc. v. J. Rodrigues Trucking, Inc., No. 16-14337, 2017
WL 1365410, at *2–4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2017) (applying “Carmack Amendment” to
carrier-liability claim, which depends on economic regulatory jurisdiction; relying on
East Texas Freight Lines and other Interstate Commerce Act cases); see also 49 U.S.C.
§ 13506(a)(4)-(6) (containing the agricultural exemption).
376. 49 U.S.C. § 13506 (a)(1)–(6).
377. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 667 (1965).
378. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
379. See HAMILTON, supra note 4, at 159.
380. See supra Part V.A.
381. See John Brueggemann & Cliff Brown, The Decline of Industrial Unionism in
the Meatpacking Industry: Event-Structure Analyses of Labor Unrest, 1946-1987, 30
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 327, 327 (2003), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/
10.1177/0730888403253912 (arguing that meatpackers remained highly organized
through the mid-twentieth century, but the development of new technologies, geographic
reorganization of production, and new pools of cheap non-union labor eviscerated United
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unions to organize and maintain the firm once representation rights were
won.382 Collective bargaining did not inhibit the geographic dispersion of
beef processing plants, even though they are owned by a handful of large
unionized enterprises.383 Many of these local and regional facilities are not
organized.
Collective bargaining, when it is effective at all, puts a floor under wage
rates and, usually, through collectively bargained work rules, limits
employer flexibility to accommodate new technologies by reassigning or
shrinking the workforce.384
Collective bargaining was crystallizing as a labor market institution while
long cattle drives were disappearing.385 As the second and third waves of
Creative Destruction were occurring, the law of collective bargaining, which
emerged in fits and starts from the 1880s until the 1940s, was a pragmatic
response to widespread social unrest manifested by outbreaks of strikes
throughout the period.386 The content of the regulatory regime that emerged,
reflected the ongoing tension between profits and productivity on the one
hand, and quality of work-life on the other. Much of the content was shaped
by the insights of a robust generation of labor law and industrial relations
academics.
In theory, the rights, privileges, and procedures that define labor law387
create a regime of industrial democracy in which employee representatives
and enterprise management can work together to chart the course of the
enterprise, including its adaptation to changes in technologies and business
models. Sometimes it has worked this way, as in the post-World War II
collective-bargaining agreements that accommodated greatly increased coal
mine productivity in exchange for sharing some of the profit gains through
employee benefit trusts388 and in some of the railroad crew size-reduction
Packinghouse Workers of America).
382. See UFCWMeat Packing & Food Processing, UNITED FOOD&COM. WORKERS,
http://www.ufcw.org/meat-packing/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2019) (reporting changes in
industry structure that have made union organizing more difficult and reporting that
seventy percent of beef consumed in the U.S. is processed by UFCW members).
383. See id.
384. See Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration as A Continuation of the Collective
Bargaining Process, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 573 (1990).
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (giving employees the right to engage in collective action
with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions); see also 45 U.S.C. § 153
(conferring a similar right to airline and railroad employees).
388. See E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 504–06 (1998) (recounting the history of
bargaining for health care benefits for coal miners).
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agreements of the early 1980s.389
For the most part, however, collective-bargaining has not worked to
accommodate change, but rather to delay it as long as possible and to prevent
firms from realizing the economic benefits of new technologies. Crew-size
agreements and other work rules in the railroad industry are dramatic
examples. Sixty years after diesel locomotive technology made locomotive
firemen unnecessary, railroads were still obligated to employ and pay
them.390 Through the same period, rail labor worked effectively to legislate
many collective bargain restrictions into statutory law at the state level.391
The trucking industry suffered similarly. The Teamsters union insisted on
collectively bargained provisions to protect the market share of large
unionized trucking operators which blocked as much as possible the entry of
smaller operators that might offer a lower rate and be harder to organize.392
In California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n. v. Associated General
Contractors,393 the court of appeals described the limitation on owner-
operators, while finding that it did not violate the antitrust laws outside the
labor exemption:
The MLA may have an effect upon the appellants, but it is an indirect
effect. The MLA does not prohibit the use of owner-operators by the
employers. Under the MLA, an employer may obtain trucks or equipment
from any source. The only requirement is that the owner-operators must
be cleared before starting to work on the second day. To be cleared, the
owner-operators must present themselves and proof of legal or registered
ownership at Local 36’s office. The owner-operators are not subject to
the provisions of Article II(B)(2) and (3) which require that employers
first seek workmen from the appropriate union.394
The Teamsters Union represents workers in the food processing industry,
such as forklift drivers, machine operators, and production line workers.395
389. See UTU v. Conrail, 535 F. Supp. 697, 701–02 (Reg’l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1982)
(explaining the history of crew-consist controversy and the Conrail crew consist
agreement).
390. See Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 442 F.2d 794, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (recounting the history of efforts to eliminate
firemen from diesel locomotives).
391. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R.
Co., 393 U.S. 129, 143–44 (1968) (upholding the constitutionality of full crew laws).
392. See Richards v. Neilsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[W]e
can assume that the terminations were either in response to back solicitations by
Foothills, or in response to pressure by the Union on each major carrier not to interline
with Foothills until Foothills recognized the Union.”) (finding conduct to be within the
labor exemption to the antitrust laws).
393. 562 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1977).
394. Id. at 613.
395. Int’l Bhd. of the Teamsters Union, Food Processing Division, TEAMSTERSBLOG,
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The Union does not advertise that it represents any truck drivers in the cattle
hauling industry or adjacent processing industries.396
The exclusion of independent contractors from the collective-bargaining
system397 provided more breathing room for the owner-operator part of the
trucking industry to develop and establish a foothold in the beef industry.
The statutory definition of “employees” enjoying collective-bargaining
rights worked in conjunction with the agricultural exemption from economic
regulation for this part of the trucking industry.398
In Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB,399 however, the Supreme Court agreed
with the court of appeals that the NLRB permissibly determined that “live
haul” crews were statutory employees, outside the agricultural exemption.400
The employees in question were chicken catchers, forklift operators, and
truck drivers who collected birds raised by independent contract growers and
transported them to Holly Farms processing plant for slaughter.401 The court
noted that the National Labor Relations Act’s agricultural exemption is
interpreted according to the agricultural exemption in the Fair Labor
Standards Act.402
Section 3(f) of the FLSA provides:
“Agriculture” includes farming in all its branches and among other things
includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production,
cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural
commodities (including commodities defined as agricultural commodities
in section 1141j(g) of title 12), the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing
animals, or poultry, and any practices (including any forestry or lumbering
operations) performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in
conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for
market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to
https://teamster.org/divisions/food-processing (last visited Sept. 30, 2019) (see also
sidebar on other divisions).
396. Id.
397. See Pan Alaska Trucking v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 621 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D.
Alaska 1985) (holding that association of independent truckers, supported by Teamsters
Union, did not qualify for labor exemption of antitrust laws; denying motions to dismiss
antitrust suit). CompareN. American Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 604 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (declining to enforce NLRB order because moving-van drivers were
independent contractors and outside the coverage of NLRA;), with Corp. Express
Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (enforcing NLRB order and
finding that express delivery owner-operator truck drivers were NLRA employees under
entrepreneurship test).
398. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2018).
399. 517 U.S. 392 (1996).
400. Id. at 408–09.
401. Id. at 394.
402. Id. at 397–98 (quoting and applying § 3(f) of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(f)).
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market.403
Notably, the subsection expressly includes “raising of livestock,” which
likely includes cow-calf operations, “preparation for market,” which
logically includes feedlots and packing houses, “delivery to market,” and
“carriers for transportation to market, which likely includes transport
between segments of the market.404 The Supreme Court, however,
distinguished between “primary” agricultural activities, such as raising of
beef, and “secondary” activities, such as delivery, storage, and transportation
of beef.405
The Court easily concluded that primary farming includes raising
poultry.406 “All agree that the independent growers, who raise Holly Farms’
broiler chickens on their own farms, are engaged in primary agriculture.”407
The activities in question, however, were not “performed by a farmer.”408
Nor were the operations necessarily “incidental” to farming, given that the
live-haul work began after the farmers’ contractual obligation ended, and
that the farmers did not participate in the live-haul operation, and that live-
haul crew activities were integrated with Holly Farm’s processing operations
rather than with farming operations.409
This interpretation, while not compelled by the statute, was sufficiently
reasonable to be within the Board’s statutory discretion.410 It also accords
with the Department of Labor’s interpretive guidance, quoted below, the
Court said.411
Labor Department guidance interpreting the FLSA exemption says: “[n]o
matter how closely related it may be to farming operations, a practice
performed neither by a farmer nor on a farm is not within the scope of the
‘secondary’ meaning of ‘agriculture.’”412
Sections 780.120 and 780.121 of the regulation address the “raising of
livestock.”413 Section 780.120 makes it clear that cattle are “livestock.”414
Section 780.121 says:
403. 29 U.S.C. § 203(f) (2018).
404. Id.
405. Holly Farms Corp., 517 U.S. at 398.
406. Id. at 399.
407. Id. at 399–400.
408. Id. at 400.
409. Id. at 402–04.
410. Id. at 408–09.
411. Id. at 408.
412. 29 C.F.R. § 780.129. (2018).
413. Id. §§ 780.120–780.121.
414. Id. § 780.120.
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The term “raising” employed with reference to livestock in section
3(f) includes such operations as the breeding, fattening, feeding, and
general care of livestock. Thus, employees exclusively engaged in feeding
and fattening livestock in stock pens where the livestock remains for a
substantial period of time are engaged in the “raising” of livestock. The
fact that the livestock is purchased to be fattened and is not bred on the
premises does not characterize the fattening as something other than the
“raising” of livestock. The feeding and care of livestock does not
necessarily or under all circumstances constitute the “raising” of such
livestock, however. It is clear, for example, that animals are not being
“raised” in the pens of stockyards or the corrals of meat packing plants
where they are confined for a period of a few days while en route to
slaughter or pending their sale or shipment. Therefore, employees
employed in these places in feeding and caring for the constantly changing
group of animals cannot reasonably be regarded as “raising” livestock
(NLRB v. Tovrea Packing Co., 111 F. 2d 626, cert. denied 311 U.S.
668; Walling v. Friend, 156 F. 2d 429). Employees of a cattle raisers’
association engaged in the publication of a magazine about cattle, the
detection of cattle thefts, the location of stolen cattle, and apprehension of
cattle thieves are not employed in raising livestock and are not engaged in
agriculture.415
Thus, employees of cow-calf operators and feedlots are unequivocally
within the exemption.416
C. Antitrust Law
Contrasted with its approach to transportation law and labor law, the
federal government moved aggressively to use competition law to reshape
the industry.417 The effort had little effect, however.418
Antitrust law had relatively little to do with the evolution of the
industry.419 Cow-calf operations separated from large scale ranching and
415. Id. § 780.121.
416. Id.
417. Perritt, supra note 3, at 401; see William Estuardo Rosales, Comment,
Dethroning Economic Kings: The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 and its Modern
Awakening, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1497, 1507–08 (2004) (describing the federal
government’s late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century efforts to curb price-fixing and
other illegal anti-competitive practices in the cattle industry).
418. Perritt, supra note 3, at 401; see James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era:
Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50
OHIO ST. L. J. 257, 293 (1989) (noting that nineteenth-century regulators were unable to
foresee that anticompetitive conduct would not have nearly as much impact on
“persistent market power” in the cattle industry as new technology and economies of
scale).
419. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 426–27 (discussing the changes in the industry that
occurred due to land, labor, capital, technology, and entrepreneurship). But see Bullard,
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replaced part of its function while remaining decentralized.420 This occurred
because of land scarcity, land-use policies, technology, and other market
forces, not because of law.421 Feedlots replaced the other function of large
scale ranching.422 Feedlots also have a less centralized structure than the big
nineteenth-century ranches, driven by technology and market forces; not by
law.423
Antitrust law targeted the beef packing segment, and there it had little
effect; beef packer concentration was high, and greater at the end of the
twentieth century.424 The early twentieth-century antitrust attack on the beef
packers was motivated by cattlemen’s rage against developments in the
market for beef. Beef prices had declined in the middle of the Populist
Movement.425 This came on the heels of an excess of the British capital,
overgrazing, speculation, and the end of open range ranching by the winter
of 1886–1887.426
The combination of decreased supply — twenty-five percent of the
Northern Plains herds were killed by the winter, some probably exaggerated,
estimates said — and depressed prices meant sharply reduced revenues for
supra note 226, at 562–63 (detailing how the USDA implemented regulations for the
cattle industry in 1974).
420. Perritt, supra note 3, at 399; see Marc Stimpert, Clear the Air: Counterpoint:
Opportunities Lost and Opportunities Gained: Separating Truth from Myth in the
Western Ranching Debate, 36 ENVTL. L. 481, 496 (2006) (explaining that the change to
the farming system was a difficult shift from farming practices of the past that allowed
closed ranching).
421. Perritt, supra note 3, at 426–27. But see George Cameron Coggins, The Law of
Public Rangeland Management V: Prescriptions for Reform, 14 ENVTL. L. 497, 497
(1984) (explaining that Congress attempted legal remedies when it gave the Bureau and
Land Management over 170 million acres of land to control).
422. Perritt, supra note 3, at 398; Hubbs, supra note 80, at 2.
423. Perritt, supra note 3, at 398–99; Drouillard, supra note 213, at 1007–08.
424. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 400 (arguing that the cause of rising beef prices was
likely “overgrazing, overinvestment, and the obsolescence of open-range ranching
brought about by steel plows, windmills, and barbed wire” and not beef packers’
conspiracies); Sutton, supra note 202.
425. Samuel Western, The Wyoming Cattle Boom, 1868-1886, WYOHISTORY.ORG
(Nov. 8, 2014), https://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/wyoming-cattle-boom-1868-
1886.
426. Wholesale prices for cattle surged to $6.47 per hundredweight in May 1870,
remaining between $4.00 and $5.00 per hundredweight for most of the 1870s. They
dipped to $4.00 in 1880 but climbed back to $7.00 by 1882. This stimulated a new surge
in British investment. Overgrazing and the drought threaten production, the oversupply
continued to depress prices, to $3.16 per hundredweight in November 1886. Then came
the winter of 1886-1887, causing a loss of at least fifteen percent of the herds—most
estimates are much higher, but probably inflated. Cattle prices did not climb back to
$7.00 per hundredweight until 1910. SeeWestern, supra note 425.
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the loudest voices in the industry.427 They looked for someone to blame other
than the invisible hand of the marketplace. The Populist Movement made
any large corporation an attractive target, and the five largest meatpackers
qualified.428 The Roosevelt Administration eventually yielded to this
pressure and brought an antitrust action against the packers.429
The same technologies and market expansions that created surplus corn,
leading to feedlots for cattle, also threatened to reduce farmer incomes, as
prices fell in the face of greatly increased supply.430 Similarly, the
technologies that were reshaping the beef industry made it increasingly
difficult for traditional participants in that market to maintain the status quo.
Change is always painful, and the capacity to make a change is unevenly
distributed, that is the “destruction” part of Creative Destruction.431 Farmers
and ranchers reacted by seeking someone to blame for the threats to their
livelihoods. Railroads and beef packers proved to be attractive targets.432
Beef packers were remote and depersonalized from corporate form, which
made it easy to demonize them. Political entrepreneurs of the Populist and
Progressive Movements fanned the flames.433
427. Id. (showing prices were sluggish because more land was being brought into beef
production on small enclosed plots).
428. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 400 (noting the lawsuit filed against the big five
meatpackers); James L. Hunt, Populism, Law, and the Corporation: The 1987 Kansas
Supreme Court, 66 J. AGRIC. HIST. 28, 28–30 (1992), https://search.proquest.com/
openview/ecdfff30e40ae773de89421537490e68/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=1816684
(stating Populism was anticorporate and government ownership of “natural
monopolies”); Alan Furman Westin, The Supreme Court, The Populist Movement and
the Campaign of 1896, J. POL. 3 (Feb. 1953), https://www.jstor.org/stable/2126191
(mentioning the effect of Supreme Court opinions from 1876 to 1896 on the Populist
movement).
429. Perritt, supra note 3, at 400. See generally Gordon David, Swift and Co. v.
United States: The Beef Trust and the Stream of Commerce Doctrine, 28 A. J. LEGAL
HIST. 244, (1984) (detailing the political and legal history surrounding Swift & Co. v.
United States).
430. Perritt, supra note 3, at 393; Kelton, supra note 47 (showing that changes in the
technology of cattle ranching led to turmoil in the industry).
431. Arthur M. Jr., Diamond, The Creative Destruction of Labor Policy, 2
LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 107, 107 (2014), http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/08/article/2014/08/lp-6-2-22.pdf.
432. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 399–400 (discussing the controversy over the “Beef
Trust” where beef packers were blamed for the rise in the cost of beef); JOSHUA SPECHT,
REDMEAT REPUBLIC 247–48 (2019).
433. Perritt, supra note 3, at 399–400 (explaining “political entrepreneur” as the term
is used in the text, which includes office seekers and officeholders, and other political
activists such as party leaders, newspaper editors and reporters and other kinds of
“reformers”); Robert B. Shepherd, Jr.,What Roosevelt Thought: A Rough Rider’s Guide
to the USTEA, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 311, 314 (2010) (explaining that progressive
politicians were concerned over corporate abuses and sought to highly regulate business
204 AMERICANUNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW Vol. 9:2
The result was the Sherman Antitrust Act and a general trust-busting
movement.434 The economics of the movement sought to inhibit
technology’s effects retarding more effective production and distribution by
larger regional and national entities.435
The movement was quite powerful, animating a large part of the domestic
program of the Roosevelt Administration, including prosecution and civil
lawsuits against the “beef trust” brought under the Sherman Act.436
In Swift & Co. v. United States,437 the Supreme Court affirmed, in material
part, the injunction against the “beef trust” granted by the circuit court.438
Although the Court accepted the government and the ranchers’ theory that
meatpacker conspiracies had depressed beef prices, far more likely causes
were overgrazing,439 overinvestment, and obsolescence of open range
ranching brought about by steel plows, windmills, and barbed wire.440
The court characterized the Government’s claims:
[I]t charges a combination of a dominant proportion of the dealers in fresh
meat throughout the United States not to bid against each other in the live-
stock markets of the different states, to bid up prices for a few days in
order to induce the cattle men to send their stock to the stock yards, to fix
prices at which they will sell, and to that end to restrict shipments of meat
when necessary, to establish a uniform rule of credit to dealers, and to keep
a black list, to make uniform and improper charges for cartage, and finally
to get less than lawful rates from the railroads, to the exclusion of
competitors . . . . [A]fter all the specific charges, there is a general
trust forms).
434. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018) (protecting trade and commerce against unlawful
restraints and monopolies).
435. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 427; Progressives and the Era of Trustbusting,
CONST. RIGHTS FOUND. (2007), https://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-23-
1-b-progressives-and-the-era-of-trustbusting.html (noting the effect of outlawing the
combination or conspiracy to “monopolize any part of the trade or commerce”).
436. Perritt, supra note 3, at 400; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 395
(1905) (applying the Sherman Antitrust Act to allow the government to regulate the meat
industry and prevent leading meatpackers from fixing beef prices from stockyards with
the intent to control meat across states).
437. 196 U.S. 400 (1905).
438. Id. at 402 (affirming Swift & Co. v. United States, 122 F. 529, 529–530 (C.C. N.
D. Ill. 1903).
439. See Morrow-Thomas Hardware Co. v. Comm’r, 22 T.C. 781, 788–89 (Tax. Ct.
1954) (discussing the agricultural history of the plains, including the dust bowl, along
with the proposition that proper farming practices could prevent a “dust condition”);
Merrill, supra note 345, at 435 (describing the tension between homesteaders and
ranchers as ranchers sought federal protection of grazing rights).
440. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 400; STEVEN F. MEHLS, THE NEW EMPIRE OF THE
ROCKIES: A HISTORY OFNORTHEAST COLORADO 57–58 (Frederic J. Athearn ed., 1984)
(describing how market prices for cattle declined partially due to overgrazing).
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allegation that the defendants are conspiring with one another, the
railroads and others, to monopolize the supply and distribution of fresh
meat throughout the United States, etc., as has been stated above, and it
seems to us that this general allegation of intent colors and applies to all
the specific charges of the bill.441
The eventual remedy was to force the divestiture of significant parts of the
five dominant national beef processors and to reverse the vertical integration
that markets and technology had produced through the entrepreneurship of
Swift and his contemporaries.442
The Federal Trade Commission concluded in 1918443 that a market sharing
agreement among the big five packers market-sharing took:
[T]he form of a livestock pool, providing substantially for the division of
purchases of the cattle, sheep, and hogs sent to market according to certain
fixed percentages . . . . With each packer purchasing only a certain
percentage of livestock . . . each is bound to have relatively the same
proportion of meat for sale . . . . In brief, the prearranged division of
livestock purchases forms the essential basis of a system, by which the big
packers are relieved of all fear of each other’s competition and, acting
together, are able to determine broadly not only what the live- stock
producers receive for their cattle and hogs, but what the consumer shall
pay for his meat.444
The consent decree in 1920445 provided for the divestiture of packer
interests in stockyards, terminal railroads, cold storage warehouses, and
retail meat markets.446
The result was the opening up of market-entry opportunities for retailers
and distributors of processed beef and the power of processor-owned
feedlots. For the most part, however, the antitrust suit left intact the market
structure for live cattle.447 Beef ranchers continued to do business mainly
under the influence of supply and demand in the global market for grain and
meat and continued to be threatened with obsolescence if they did not
441. Swift & Co., 196 U.S. at 394–95.
442. See AZZEDDINEM. AZZAM& DALE G. ANDERSON, ASSESSING COMPETITION IN
MEATPACKING: ECONOMIC HISTORY, THEORY, AND EVIDENCE 1, 21 (1996) [hereinafter
COMPETITION INMEATPACKING].
443. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE
MEAT-PACKING INDUSTRY: SUMMARY AND PART I 28 (1919).
444. William H. Nicholls,Market-Sharing in the Packing Industry, 22 J. FARMECON.
225, 225 (1940) (quoting FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 443.).
445. See Swift & Co., 276 U.S. at 319–21 (describing the 1920 consent decree and
litigation that produced it and rejecting the claim that consent decree was void).
446. COMPETITION INMEATPACKING, supra note 442, at 1, 22.
447. Id. at 1 (proposing that neither the consent decree nor the Packers and Stockyard
Act had a direct effect on the meatpacking industry).
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embrace new technologies.448
Fifty years later, in United States v. Armour & Co.,449 the Supreme Court
held that the Consent Decree did not prohibit Greyhound Corporation from
acquiring Armour, one of the defendants to the consent decree.450 The Court
explained the Government’s argument:
The crucial provision, Paragraph Fourth, forbids the corporate defendants
from “engaging in or carrying on” commerce in the enumerated product
lines. This language, taken in its natural sense, bars only active conduct
on the part of the defendants. Thus Armour could not trade in these
products, either under its own corporate form, or through its ‘officers,
directors, agents, or servants.’ The entry of Armour into the grocery
business through subsidiaries is clearly and draconically prevented by the
separate provision of Paragraph Fourth forbidding the defendant
meatpackers from owning ”any * * * interests whatsoever” in a firm
trading in the enumerated commodities. In the Government’s view these
prohibitions also bar Armour from having any ownership relationship
with corporations like Greyhound. The Government contends
that Armour has an obligation not to engage directly or indirectly in legal
or economic association with firms in the retail food business. It refers to
the prohibited relationship between Armour and Greyhound.451
The Court disagreed, holding that the Consent Decree does not bar
relationships, only conduct.452
In its opinion, the Court summarized the litigation history of the Consent
Decree:
Since 1920, the decree has withstood a motion to vacate it in its
entirety, Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928), and two
attempts on the part of the defendants to have it modified in light of alleged
changed circumstances. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106
(1932); United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 892 (ND Ill.
1960), aff’d, 367 U.S. 909 (1961). Thus the decree stood at the time this
case arose, and still stands, as originally written.453
Cattlemen have not given up their efforts to blame the beef packers for
market reverses. In In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation,454 the district
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument under the Sherman Act that alleged
448. Id. at 22 (stating that technological developments such as “transportation and
refrigeration” may have had an impact on the meatpacking industry).
449. 402 U.S. 673 (1971).
450. Id. at 687–88.
451. Id. at 678.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 678.
454. 542 F. Supp. 1122 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
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that grocery retailers conspired to hold down the prices they paid to packers,
which restrictions were directly passed on to feedlot operators.455
Despite the commotion and political rhetoric occasioned by the lawsuit
and the 1920 Consent Decree — and more recent lawsuits — antitrust law
did little to slow the concentration of beef packing, which continued to
increase throughout the twentieth century,456 in terms of ownership, though
not in size and location of processing facilities. The structure of that segment
of the industry was a result of technology and business models, and the law
could not do much about it.457
Despite this, cattlemen continue to assert conspiracies by the meatpackers
in violation of the antitrust laws. The 1903 litigation and the 1920 Consent
Decree, however, may have discouraged the packers from vertically
integrating.458 Economies of scale in the retail food industry and the
broadening of product lines for the major beef packer brands logically could
have led to forward integration into the retail sector, but such a corporate
strategy would have sailed directly into the wind represented by the Consent
Decree, and courts refused to lift or modify it in 1928, 1932, and 1960.459
Similarly, the economics of feedlot operations suggest the desirability of
backward integration by packers into that sector. But the data shows that
packers have used other techniques, such as participation in futures markets,
and signing forward contracts with feedlots and cow-calf operators, to realize
some of the benefits of vertical integration.460 The economics of cow-calf
operations, constrained as they are by land scarcity and environmental
concerns, make it less likely that beef packers could find a way of integrating
into that sector.461
455. Id. at 1141–42 (“The true facts are that the packers’ calculations of anticipated
profit have no such formulaic operation nor have feeders shown the inelasticity of the
supply.”).
456. See CONCENTRATION IN THEREDMEAT PACKING INDUSTRY, supra note 5, at 71–
72 (summarizing the history of the beef industry since 1600).
457. See generally Robert M. Aduddell & Louis P. Cain, The Consent Decree in the
Meatpacking Industry, 1920-1956, 55 BUS. HIST. REV. 359 (1981) (concluding that
consent decree tended to deprive society of rational structural change but was largely
ineffective).
458. Aduddell & Cain, supra note 457, at 371.
459. See Sutton, supra note 202, at 612; see also Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 673
(1971).
460. See Sutton, supra note 202, at 612 (discussing the history of meatpacking from
the early 1920s, elaborating that vertical integration has led to more companies signing
forward contracts); see also MORGAN HAYENGA ET. AL., MEAT PACKER VERTICAL
INTEGRATION AND CONTRACT LINKAGES IN THE BEEF AND PORK INDUSTRIES: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 19–20 (2000) (listing reasons for vertical integration in the beef
industry).
461. See PEARSON HIGHER EDUC., AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. BEEF INDUSTRY 7, 8
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Moreover, the continued readiness of cattlemen to blame their
disappointments on violations of competition law by beef packers probably
exerts an in terrorem effect on beef packer integration strategies.
D. Agricultural Subsidies and Mandates
General agricultural policies had opposing effects on the beef industry.
Price supports for corn artificially increased the supply and lower the price
for the most important type of cattle feed, tending to increase cattle
production.462 On the other hand, mandates for ethanol as a fuel tended to
crowd out cattle feed as a use for corn, thus increasing the price and reducing
the number of cattle produced.463
The agricultural sector has experienced less government regulation than
other sectors, but it has enjoyed other forms of government intervention.
Beef production is not subsidized directly, but a variety of corn subsidies and
stabilization measures influence beef production indirectly.464 Particularly
important are ethanol mandates for fuel. While the government has been
abstentionist with respect to regulation of product markets in the beef
industry, and with respect to regulation of labor markets through collective
bargaining, it has been activist with respect to the subsidization of factor
markets.465 Corn is the most important agricultural crop in the United States,
and close to half of it is animal feed.466 Feed accounts for sixty-five percent
(2016) (explaining that forage supply may be affected by environmental changes, which
has a direct effect on the price of production for the cattle industry).
462. See Thomas Capehart, Feedgrains Sector at a Glance, U. S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.
ECON. RESEARCH SERV. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn-
and-other-feedgrains/feedgrains-sector-at-a-glance/ (explaining how the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act allows farmers to make their own cropping
decisions, leading to an increase in the amount of corn being produced in order to
increase the number of cattle they can maintain).
463. See Joshua A. Byrge & Kevin L. Kliesen, Ethanol: Economic Gain or Drain?,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (July 1, 2008), https://www.stlouisfed.org/
publications/regional-economist/july-2008/ethanol-economic-gain-or-drain (explaining
the federal government requires a 500% increase in ethanol production by 2022, which
will inevitably increase the proportion of the nation’s corn crop).
464. See Daniel A. Sumner, Agricultural Subsidy Programs, ECONLIB, https://www.
econlib.org/library/Enc/AgriculturalSubsidyPrograms.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2019)
(explaining how much of the government support for agriculture comes in the form of
indirect consequences from the subsidies it provides).
465. See Ethics Insiders, Should Governments Subsidise the Meat and Dairy
Industries?, MEDIUM (Dec. 19, 2016), https://medium.com/@laletur/should-govern
ments-subsidy-the-meat-and-dairy-industries-6ce59e68d26 (explaining that
governments have subsidized certain food products in order to affect consumer habits by
driving down prices).
466. See Capehart, supra note 462.
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of the total cost of raising beef for slaughter.467 Accordingly, cattle
production is quite sensitive to corn markets.
USDA price supports in the form of subsidies for the difference between
an administratively determined reference price and the market price for corn
results in an artificially large corn supply because it boosts the revenue
farmers receive from growing corn above the revenue that market prices
would produce.468 This suppresses corn prices and reduces the cost of beef
production.469 The effect is the same as if the government directly subsidized
beef production.470
Two forces have offset this phenomenon. First, government promotion of
ethanol as part of a pathway toward energy independence471 has diverted
thirty percent of the corn crop, resulting in a reduced percentage available
for animal feed, and tending to increase the price.472 Ethanol production,
467. See Greg Lardy, A Cow-calf Producer’s Guide to Custom Feeding, N.D. STATE
UNIVERSITY (May 2018), https://www.ag.ndsu.edu/publications/livestock/a-cow-calf-
producers-guide-to-custom-feeding (referring to the Worksheet for Projecting Cost of
Gain and Breakeven Price, which demonstrates that $498.54 total feedlot cost, divided
by $326.25 total feed cost equates to sixty-five percent).
468. See USDA Communications, $14.5 Billion to Be Paid to US Farmers in Latest
Market Facilitation Program, HOOSIER AG TODAY (May 23, 2019), https://www.
hoosieragtoday.com/14-5-billion-paid-us-farmers-latest-market-facilitation-program/
(describing types of payments); USDA Press Release, USDA Announces Details of
Support Package for Farmers, U. S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (July 25, 2019), https://www.
usda.gov/media/press-releases/2019/07/25/usda-announces-details-support-package-
farmers (announcing a temporary program of price supports due to Chinese trade
disruptions).
469. See Wes Ishmael, Corn Prices Shift Opportunity, BEEF (June 28, 2019),
https://www.beefmagazine.com/marketing/corn-prices-shift-opportunity.
470. See Stephanie Henry, Corn Prices Continue to Look for Support, DROVERS (Oct.
23, 2018), https://www.drovers.com/article/corn-prices-continue-look-support
(discussing relationship among corn prices, corn supply, USDA policies, and cattle
markets).
471. See U.S. Department of Energy, Key Federal Legislation, ALT. FUELS DATA
CTR., https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/key_legislation (stating that the federal government
provides a variety of tax credits and other incentives for ethanol); The Energy
Independence and Security Act, 42 U.S.C § 7545 (2)(B)(i)(I) (2009) (providing that
transportation fuel must include a minimum of 36 billion gallons of renewable fuels by
2022;ethanol is the dominant biofuel at present, but the 2007 legislation intends to shift
the total supply to other biofuels, such as cellulosic biofuels).
472. See Drouillard, supra note 213 (reporting that growth in ethanol industry shifted
feedlot feed to distiller’s grain, now comprising ten percent to as high as seventy percent
of feedlot feed); Andrew Gottschalk, The Impacts of the U.S. Corn/Ethanol Policy on the
U.S. Cattle Industry, INST. OF AGRIC. & NAT. RES. (Dec. 11–13, 2007),
https://beef.unl.edu/beefreports/symp-2007-01-xx.shtml (observing that the major
impact of ethanol policy is to sharply increase corn prices, negatively affecting cattle
industry, especially cow-calf sector); Nicholas Loris, Ethanol and Biofuel Policies,
Downsizing the Federal Government, DOWNSIZING GOV’T (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/ethanol-and-biofuel-policies (arguing that
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however, produces another source of cattle feed — distiller’s grain, a
byproduct of the ethanol refining process.473 The net effect of ethanol policy
has been to advantage Midwestern cattle producers.474
Second, changing dietary habits and, to a lesser extent, the campaign
against global warming, have decreased beef consumption.475 The
combination of reduced demand and higher feed prices have resulted in an
equilibrium of price and supply different from what the market would have
produced.476 Quantifying the difference is challenging because the ethanol
subsidies did not simply divert a large percentage of a fixed level of corn
production, it also called forth additional land into corn production.
The ethanol subsidies and mandate introduced a new degree of freedom
for farmers. In addition to electing between corn and another crop, they can
elect to sell their corn to an ethanol refinery or a feedlot.477
VI. THE FUTURE
The thesis of this article is that the world of the twentieth-century cowboy
has been shaped by technology and changes in business practices, and
relatively little by law. The future of the cowboy and his industry in the
twenty-first century will be shaped much more by law, although technology,
of course, will continue to play an important role. The laws that shaped the
cattle industry in the nineteenth century and the laws from which the cattle
industry was largely exempt in the twentieth century were laws of general
application, relating to property rights, economic regulation of
“top-down” subsidies and mandates has “harmed consumers, damaged the economy, and
produced negative environmental effects”).
473. See Gottschalk, supra note 472 (noting that Distillers’ Dried Grain (“DDG”) is
mostly available in the Midwest because spoilage and transportation costs generally limit
its use to within 60 miles of ethanol refinery).
474. See id. (noting that ethanol policy results in as much as a $50 per head advantage
to midwestern cattle producers).
475. See Yan Zheng et al., Association of Changes in Red Meat Consumption with
Total and Cause Specific Mortality Among US Women and Men: Two Prospective
Cohort Studies, BMJ (June 12, 2019), https://www.bmj.com/content/365/bmj.l2110
(finding that the consumption of red meat has a direct relationship with an increase in
mortality rates); Abigail Abrams, How Eating Less Meat Could Help Protect the Planet
From Climate Change, TIME (Aug. 8, 2019), https://time.com/5648082/un-climate-
report-less-meat/ (finding that the production of red meat has an adverse relationship
with climate change due to the grazing patterns of the animals used).
476. See Dillion Feuz, Understanding Beef Demand, BEEF (Feb. 24, 2009), https://
www.beefmagazine.com/sectors/retail/0225-understanding-beef-demand (explaining
the relationship between consumer demand and the price of beef).
477. See Larry Stalcup, Competing with the Big Boys, BEEF (Nov. 1, 2007),
https://www.beefmagazine.com/sectors/feedlot/competing_big_boys (noting that there
is a great financial incentive for farmers to sell their crop to an ethanol plant).
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transportation, and collective bargaining.478 The laws likely to channel the
effects of new technologies in the cattle industry in the twenty-first century
are different. They target the beef industry and seek to change its practices
directly.
Here is one projection for the future of the industry:
With ample supplies of lower-cost ethanol by-products, smaller feedlots
in the Midwestern United States will be an important part of the industry,
but overall, increasing corporate ownership (private and publicly traded
companies) seems probable in both the United States and Canada. With
generally favorable weather conditions, less-restrictive nutrient
management and environmental concerns, and relatively limited urban
encroachment, the Great Plains of the United States and the western
provinces of Canada should continue to be the major of cattle feeding
areas in North America.479
The author continues:
In contrast to feedlots, consolidation in the North American cow-calf
industry is limited by the capital required for land, particularly in the semi-
arid western cow-calf production areas. As a result, cow-calf production
is likely to remain structurally diverse for the foreseeable future. With a
decreasing cow herd for the next few years and significant feeding
capacity, however, it seems plausible that an increase in contractual
arrangements between feedlots, particularly the large cattle feed
companies, and the cow-calf and stocker operators who supply cattle will
occur over the next few years. Such alliances should facilitate animal
identification and traceability through the food chain, provide the
opportunity for applying genetic selection tools in cow-calf herds that
might benefit feedlot performance and marketing (e.g., markers for feed
efficiency or carcass traits), and allow for implementation of pre- and early
postweaning management strategies to improve animal health.480
Kirby and Bennington’s futures will be determined by five large forces,
themselves defining the fifth wave of Creative Destruction. Two of these
are technological; three are sociological. The technological forces are two
different aspects of robotics. Self-driving trucks will largely replace the
trucks Bennington now drives, significantly decreasing job opportunities,
while making it possible for Bennington and a few others like him to become
478. See Cattle Research, A Timeline of Changes: Beef Cattle Farming in North
America, ARROWQUIP (June 6, 2017), https://arrowquip.com/blog/cattle-research/
timeline-of-changes-beef-cattle-north-america (explaining the changes in North America
during this time period, which directly affected the cattle industry).
479. Michael L. Galyean, et al., The Future of Beef Production in North America, 1
ANIMAL FRONTIERS 29, 32 (2011).
480. Id.
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monitors and controller sitting at remote computer consoles.481
Self-driving trucks may be slower to penetrate the cattle hauling market
than other aspects of the trucking industry, however. Self-driving vehicle
technology works better in controlled environments than in uncontrolled and
unpredictable ones. In 2019, a Tesla Model Three can navigate an Interstate
highway and most urban roads reliably and safely, staying in its lane, making
lane changes only when prompted by the operator and has determined there
is no other vehicle in the way, following a prescribed distance from the
vehicle in front of it, starting and stopping with traffic flows.482 It gets lost,
however, when its automatic pilot is triggered on a secondary road without
stripes marking the centerline and the sides of the road.
Discriminating between the side of the pavement and an unpaved shoulder
is much harder than maintaining a prescribed distance from a white line, and
discriminating between the surface of an unpaved road and the shoulder or
the drainage ditch is even harder. The point is not that a robot cannot be
designed to operate in the remote territory; it can. The point is that the design
challenges are much greater, and therefore, the technology is much more
expensive.
The market for self-driving trucks in any application is determined by a
comparison of the costs of buying a robotic truck and the cost of hiring a
truck driver to operate a conventional truck.483 The cattle trucks linking cow-
calf operations and feedlots and those linking most feedlots with processing
plants must operate on unimproved roads to facilities that have little
advanced technology. They are not limited to interstate highways and the
pathways connecting buildings in high-tech manufacturing facilities. It is
likely to remain much cheaper to hire Bennington to drive a conventional
truck than to design and build one that will navigate all the routes
autonomously. It will, thus, be some time before self-driving trucks have a
material impact on cattle hauling operations, even after they have taken over
much of long-haul over-the-road trucking. Bennington probably has a job
for as long as he wants it.
Other aspects of robotics will replace much of what Kirby does.
481. See Jeff Daniels, Future of Farming: Driverless Tractors, AG Robots, CNBC
(Sep. 16, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/16/future-of-farming-driverless-tract
ors-ag-robots.html (explaining the ways in which the farming industry will change as a
result of self-driving tractors).
482. See Autopilot, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/autopilot (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
483. See CSJ, Driverless Trucks Will Reduce Labor Costs, Move Toward Cure for
Driver Shortage, OIL & GAS 365 (May 31, 2019), https://www.oilandgas360.com/
driverless-trucks-will-eliminate-labor-costs-move-toward-cure-for-driver-shortage/
(claiming that self-driving trucks will help save costs because of their fuel efficiency and
longer hours of operation without needing to factor in the costs for labor).
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Inexpensive drones will observe herds, pinpoint their locations for roundups,
and identify sick or injured cattle.484 They will enable a smaller number of
cowboys like Kirby to be dispatched to deal with problems exactly where
they occur. Wheeled robots will drive cattle.485 Operating in conjunction
with automatically operated and synchronized gates, these robots will move
cattle from one corral to another and load them off and on truck trailers.
Stationary robots will handle most of the feeding operations in feedlots.
As with Bennington’s, howmuch of Kirby’s job will be replaced by robots
depends on how much the robots cost. Kirby has lots of specialized skills,
integrated in ways that are subtle and difficult to articulate and define. And
Kirby comes pretty cheap. Designing and building a robot to do what Kirby
does is very expensive, and it’s not clear that the robot would be able to do
his job as well or as quickly as he does it. So the mere possibility of advanced
robot technology does not necessarily mean lost job opportunities for Kirby.
The three sociological forces are changing dietary habits, growing concern
about environmental degradation, and growing sensitivity to animal rights.
Public concern with the adverse health effects of poor diets has been
growing. Dietary improvement was not an unknown subject in the
nineteenth century, but it has greatly intensified in the last decades of the
twentieth and the first two decades of the twenty-first century.486 Improved
nutrition science has made it possible to understand the differential effects
of eating different kinds of foods, sedentary lifestyles replacing hard manual
work on the farm and in the factory have worsened physical fitness, and
growing obesity have alarmed public health commentators.487 It is not
uncommon for them and the general press and media to refer to the situation
as a “crisis.”488
484. See Drovers, The Practicality of Drone Use in Ranching, DROVERS (Sept. 13,
2016, 9:07 AM) https://www.drovers.com/article/practicality-drone-use-ranching
(concluding that inexpensive drones can be useful for herding, monitoring fences, and
finding lost stock); see also Heather Smith Thomas, Are You Ready for a Drone?,
CANADIAN CATTLEMAN, (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.canadiancattlemen.ca/2017/
11/28/should-you-get-a-drone-for-your-cattle-operation/ (describing inexpensive drone
use on cattle ranches).
485. See Meet the Robot That’s Making Cattle Herding Safer, CARGILL (Oct. 18,
2018), https://www.cargill.com/story/meet-the-cowboy-robot-thats-making-cattle-herd
ing-safer.
486. See Americans Are Concerned About Poor Eating Habits, BARNA (July 15,
2014), https://www.barna.com/research/americans-are-concerned-about-poor-eating-
habits/ (highlighting the difference between age groups and concerns about diet).
487. See BongKyoo Choi et al., Sedentary Work, Low Physical Job Demand, and
Obesity in US Workers, 53 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 1088, 1089 (2010) (discussing the
possible cause for the obesity crisis being connected to low physical labor).
488. See David Blumenthal et al., Rising Obesity in the United States is a Public
Health Crisis, THECOMMONWEALTHFUND (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.commonwealth
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Many of the proposals for improved nutrition emphasize eating less red
meat and animal fats.489 During the same time period, consumer tastes have
shifted away from beef toward poultry, pork, and seafood.490 It is likely that
the campaign for healthier diets will continue, and that this rhetoric,
combined with food sciences improvements in “meatless hamburgers” and
other simulated beef products, will continue to exercise a restraining
influence on consumer demand for beef.491
Environmental concerns long have shaped the beef industry. Indeed, the
first wave of Creative Destruction was occasioned in part by the antagonism
of residents of towns and cities to having slaughterhouses in their
neighborhoods and cattle drives through their streets.492 The modern-day
environmental movement, generally viewed as having been triggered by
Rachel Carson’s book The Silent Spring,493 has focused environmental
protection efforts on agriculture, including the cattle industry.494 Runoffs
from feedlots as a source of water pollution have been a concern since the
earliest days of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), and
environmental activists insist that feedlot control should be strengthened495
fund.org/blog/2018/rising-obesity-united-states-public-health-crisis.
489. See ACS Guidelines for Nutrition and Physical Activity, AM. CANCER SOCIETY
(last modified Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.cancer.org/healthy/eat-healthy-get-active/
acs-guidelines-nutrition-physical-activity-cancer-prevention/guidelines.html.
490. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 372–73 (“One cannot be sure that the shift in
consumer tastes is attributable mainly to calls by experts for better nutrition; it may be a
result of simple shifts in consumer tastes, much as the first part of the Industrial
Revolution was occasioned by consumer shifts toward beef.”); see also, Richard Waite,
2018 Will See High Meat Consumption in the U.S. but the American Diet is Shifting,
WORLDRESOURCES INST. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.wri.org/blog/2018/01/2018-will-
see-high-meat-consumption-us-american-diet-shifting (depicting the decline in the
consumption of beef in favor of poultry because of increased health concerns with
consuming red meat).
491. See Brunilda Nazario, Impossible? New Veggie Burgers Make a Run at Beef,
WEBMD (May 31, 2019), https://www.webmd.com/food-recipes/news/20190531/
impossible-new-veggie-burgers-make-a-run-at-beef?print=true.
492. See Perritt, supra note 3, at 391 n.133; see, e.g., Carl Abbott, The Neighborhoods
of New York, 1760–1775, 55 N.Y. HIST. 35, 48–49 (1974).
493. See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962) (describing the adverse
environmental impact of pesticides); The Story of Silent Spring, NAT’L RES. DEF.
COUNCIL (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/story-silent-spring (discussing
influence of Silent Spring).
494. See NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 493 (discussing DDT and its effects
on animals).
495. See Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114,
118–19 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing the district court and holding that feedlot was point
source under Clean Water Act). See generally Guide Manual on NPDES Regulations
for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, EPA (Dec. 1995), https://www3.epa.
gov/npdes/pubs/owm0266.pdf (summarizing statutory and regulatory requirements
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with accompanying limitations on where feedlots can be placed. Odors and
noise from feedlots animate local zoning bodies to exclude them from areas
close to dense populations.496 As the population increases and as residential
areas penetrate further into what had been rural territory, these pressures are
likely to increase, ratcheting up the cost of land and the cost of environmental
controls for feedlot operators.
Air pollution also is a concern, greatly intensified by the campaign against
Global Warming. Approximately forty percent of greenhouse gases
originate on farms and feedlots, potent sources of methane from cattle
digestion.497 These methane sources have been largely unregulated under
the Clean Air Act because of the difficulty in addressing diffuse sources of
air pollution as contrasted with point sources,498 and because of the power of
the agricultural lobby.499
under Clean Water Act for cattle feedlots).
496. See Coyote Flats, L.L.C. v. Sanborn County Comm’n, 596 N.W.2d 347, 356–57
(S.D. 1999) (reversing the circuit court and upholding the denial of a permit to construct
feedlot); see also Altenburg v. Bd. of Supervisors, 615 N.W.2d 874, 881 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000) (upholding ordinance restricting feedlots); Greg Henderson, Missouri Feedlot





litigation by neighbors against feedlot that sought a permit to increase capacity from 900
head to 6,999).
497. See Georgina Austin, Agriculture Eyed as Culprit in Global Methane Emissions
Spike, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
14122016/agriculture-methane-emissions-climate-change (“Climate gains from a
leveling off of carbon dioxide emissions are offset by a spike in methane, bringing new
scrutiny to the livestock industry.”); see also Juliette Majot, et al., Big Meat and Big
Dairy’s Climate Emissions Put Exxon Mobile to Shame, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/07/big-meat-big-dairy-carbon-
emmissions-exxon-mobil (alleging that “three meat companies — JBS, Cargill, and
Tyson — are estimated to have emitted more greenhouse gases last year than all of
France and nearly as much as some of the biggest oil companies like Exxon, BP, and
Shell”).
498. See C. Gilmour et al., Biogeochemistry of Trace Metals and Mettaloids, SCI.
DIRECT (2009) https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/
diffuse-source (observing that diffuse sources of pollution are more difficult to control
than point sources).
499. See Direck Steimel, Keeping Up the Pressure on EPA, IOWA FARM BUREAU
(July 15, 2019), https://www.iowafarmbureau.com/Article/Keeping-up-the-pressure-on-
EPA (referring to the campaign to get EPA to increase ethanol mandates); see alsoNancy
Fink Huehnergarth, Big Agriculture Bullies and Lobbies to Keep Americans in the Dark,
FORBES (May 5, 2016 11:06 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nancyhuehnergarth/
2016/05/05/big-ag-bullies-and-lobbies-to-keep-americans-in-the-dark/#304ef676502c
(criticizing the power of the farm lobby to limit public access to information about animal
rights and competition). See generally Daniel W. Drezner, The Power of the Farm
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Intensification of efforts to mitigate global warming are certain to draw
more attention to and pressure for regulating methane emissions from cattle.
Although some reduction can be obtained by changing cattle diets,500 the
campaign against methane is likely to be translated into louder calls for
people to eat less beef, resulting in less cattle production. 501
The animal rights movement grows out of the centuries-old concern about
cruelty to animals.502 In its recent form, it has resulted in the virtual
eradication of the fur industry.503 Activists regularly target meat processing
as a source of mistreatment of animals. 504 The movement has changed the
way that cattle are handled in transport, feedlots, and slaughterhouses.505
Further, major producers consistently advertise their practices in assuring
humane treatment of the cattle that pass through their operations.506 Concern
Lobby, FOREIGN POLICY (July 26, 2007 3:20 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/
2007/07/26/the-power-of-the-farm-lobby/ (describing political power of farm lobby, in
general, and with respect to farm subsidies).
500. See Daniel Nash, Cargill Announces Commitment to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Across its North American Beef Supply Chain, CARGILL (July 24, 2019),
https://www.cargill.com/2019/cargill-announces-commitment-to-reduce-greenhouse-
gas-emissions (“Over the next three years, Cargill and TNC will work hand-in-hand with
farmers and ranchers to demonstrate how grazing management planning and adaptive
management improves sustainability outcomes related to soil, carbon storage, vegetation,
wildlife habitat, water, and other ecological parameters.”).
501. See Rachel Nuwer, Raising Beef Uses Ten Times More Resources Than Poultry,
Dairy, Eggs or Pork, SMITHSONIAN (July 21, 2014), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/
science-nature/beef-uses-ten-times-more-resources-poultry-dairy-eggs-pork-
180952103/ (“[C]easing to eat meat altogether may be the best choice for the planet.”;
making arguments that beef production is an inefficient use of resources and a major
source of greenhouse gasses).
502. See History, AM. HUMANE, www.americanhumane.org/about-us/history (last
visited Oct. 30, 2019) (reporting that American Humane Society resulted in 1877 merger
of several organizations concerned with the treatment of farm animals).
503. See John F. Burns, Fur Industry Shrinking with No End in Sight, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 26, 1991) (reporting decline of industry, due in large part, to an international
coalition of animal rights advocates).
504. See Factory Farming: Misery for Animals, PETA (last visited Sept. 28, 2019),
https://www.peta.org/issues/animals-used-for-food/factory-farming/ (“On today’s
factory farms, animals are crammed by the thousands into filthy, windowless sheds and
stuffed into wire cages, metal crates, and other torturous devices. These animals will
never raise their families, root around in the soil, build nests, or do anything that is natural
and important to them. Most won’t even feel the warmth of the sun on their backs or
breathe fresh air until the day they’re loaded onto trucks headed for slaughterhouses.”)
(concluding with call a for “vegan lifestyle”).
505. See P. M. Seng & R. Laporte, Animal Welfare: The Role and Perspectives of the
Meat and Livestock Sector, 24 REV. SCI. TECH. 613, 615 (2005), https://pdfs.
semanticscholar.org/74b7/a3d7ccdc98b10cdd7fa93b55c3a20ae17b90.pdf (analyzing
impact of animal rights concerns on the beef industry).
506. See generally Animal Welfare vs. Animal Rights, ANIMALHANDLING (last visited
Sept. 27, 2019), animalhandling.org (emphasizing industry’s humane practices); Animal
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with animal-rights and the beef industry suffers from an inherent
contradiction, however: treating cattle well is one thing, but eventually
killing them as a source for human food can be viewed — and is viewed by
some — as the ultimate cruelty and deprivation of their rights.
So the animal rights movement is necessarily, at its heart, an anti-beef
movement. The movement combines with the environmental and dietary
forces to limit the demand for beef, and therefore the level of production —
at least that is its purpose.
Welfare, CARGILL (last visited Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.cargill.com/news/animal-
welfare (“[A]nimal welfare is one of our top priorities.”).
